In March 2025, the Bundestag voted to exempt debt breaks — a fiscal rule that limits the federal government’s structural net borrowing for security and defense expenses — and to establish a new 500 billion euro infrastructure fund. Friedrich Merz, who is expected to be Germany’s next Chancellor, said that Germany should do “whatever it takes” to guarantee its own and Europe’s security, and pushed for this initiative. Nonetheless, Chancellor Olaf Scholz made a comparable statement in 2022 and promised to modernize the Bundeswehr as a battle-ready force with a special fund of 100 billion euros. A promise that did not come to fruition. It has not been the first time Berlin has made such promises, but it has been the first time the United States has shown reluctance to come to its defense. A fleeing US is terrible news for Europe, which relied on its defense umbrella for protection. Right now, Germany has to step up to its former promises for better or for worse. So, what has kept Germany from modernizing its security for so long? Can it help Germany become the leader that Europe and NATO need now? Why was the Zeitenwende of 2022 ineffective, and can it break the cycle and fulfill its promise?
Berlin’s unfinished plans
This situation has been seen before, as in 2014, Russia invaded and annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, and that same year, at the NATO summit in Wales, Germany vowed to increase its security spending to reach the 2% GDP demand for NATO members by 2024. The agreement, however, proved to be more rhetorical than factual, as in 2019, Chancellor Angela Merkel reduced the 2024 mark to 1.5% of GDP, adding that the 2% mark could only be reached by 2031. In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and once again, Germany saw its military as antiquated and unequipped for a dire situation such as the NATO mutual defense clause. Under this premise, Chancellor Olaf Scholz made a speech in which he stated that this marked a Zeitenwende (turning point) for Germany, its security, and foreign policy. The Chancellor announced a 100 billion euro special fund to modernize the Bundeswehr. Three years later, Berlin did not live up to its promise. Although the special fund was established, it proved ineffective in enhancing Germany’s defensive capabilities. 
Although the Zeitenwende speech raised public expectations and the fund was indeed approved and created, the plan’s actual implementation lagged. Much was due to logistical proceedings and bureaucracy. After the fund was created, much time and money were lost in debating what should be done, making arrangements, producing the equipment, and implementing the plans. An example is the purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the US. Though a much-needed acquisition to ensure Germany’s participation in U.S. nuclear deterrence, the negotiations took months, with the first jets not being delivered until 2026, and the entire system will not be fully operational until 2030.
Besides the planning inefficiency, the Zeintewende did deliver in improving the Bundeswehr’s readiness and expanding its operations. One of the most anticipated outcomes of this effort was the initiative to deploy a permanent brigade to Lithuania to protect NATO’s eastern flank. The brigade would serve as a mobile, quick-response force in the event of an invasion through Lithuania. This plan was welcomed by the European community, and it seemed that Germany was fulfilling its promise to contribute more to the alliance. However, the brigade lacks the military mobility to be effective, as it does not have the necessary infrastructure to serve as a quick response force. Furthermore, once the vehicles, such as tanks and other armored vehicles, are ready, they likely won’t be stored in Lithuania but in Germany. Though both countries are close, not having the equipment ready on site will defeat the purpose of having a brigade with a good cold-start capability.
What has led Germany down this path
The short answer is: the United States. The US has been the sworn protector of Europe and NATO for decades, spending more on defense than all its allies combined, owning multiple military bases all over Europe, and even storing nuclear warheads on the continent. This has been a historical reality that has eased the minds of its European allies, causing most to reduce spending on security. Germany is no exception to this “buck-passing” behavior, which can be defined as the strategy of shifting the burden onto other countries. From a structural incentives perspective, this is a very cost-effective solution, as Germany does not share a border with mainland Russia, unlike Ukraine and Poland, for example, and has a security net like NATO to back it.
This, however, has recently returned to pose a challenge to Germany, as the new administration in Washington signaled its disinterest in coming to Europe’s aid in case the latter comes under threat. Since his first term as president, Trump has been highly critical of organizations such as NATO and the World Trade Organization, labelling them as “bad deals”. He highlights how the US contributes much more than its allies to keep such organizations in place and supposedly receives little in return. One of the major repercussions of this line of thought is the current American stance regarding the war in Ukraine. In early March, the White House momentarily froze financial, military, and intelligence support for Ukraine, while also engaging in negotiations with Russia without the presence of the Ukrainians.
Another episode later in the same month further shook the foundations of US-Europe relations. A private messaging thread featuring top U.S. officials — among them the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Defense Secretary — was disclosed to the press. In that same chat, these officials expressed reluctance to support Europe, describing its dependency on American military assistance as “pathetic”.
These events have shown Europe how non-reliant the US has become. This struck a chord with EU governments, as they cannot bypass the possibility that in the worst-case scenario, the US will not come to their aid, leaving them to fend for themselves. Therefore, there is no such thing as buck-passing, as the power providing sufficient means of security has left.
What needs to be done now?
With the US security umbrella in Europe uncertain, Berlin is trying to rise to the occasion to become more independent from Washington. But as stated earlier, it had failed to muster the military effectively to do so; what does Germany need to improve on this front?
As many experts have concluded, Germany must commit to investing more and making it a priority, rather than a complementary point in its policy, to avoid dragging out its completion due to bureaucratic procedures. The first step in its plan should be investing more in Ukraine. Though being Ukraine’s second-largest donor, Germany took a long time to implement its support, and it does not contribute as much as it could. Other countries have made considerably more substantial contributions in terms of capacity, such as Denmark, which has donated more than 2% of its GDP in value, while Germany donated around 0.4%. A Ukrainian victory is a victory for European security and a rollback of Russian aggression — a prospect that should be pursued and invested in, not undermined and unattended.
A second point that needs to be addressed is the degree of efficiency when it comes to defense investments. The plans to modernize the Bundeswehr should receive substantial funding, which should be used quickly, with a clear focus on specific capacities, and effectively, instead of being dragged down by debates and bureaucracy. This will be a challenging problem to tackle, as these processes are part of institutions well-settled in the German political system, being shackled by a pattern of path dependency. Nonetheless, these processes have been counterproductive and costly not only financially but also reputation-wise. If Germany does not show progress on this front, it will be unable to project force to gather its allies around and to pose a considerable threat to countries such as Russia. Moreover, showcasing effective military capabilities can function as a strategic communication tool to bolster recruitment — an area where the Bundeswehr also faces significant challenges at the moment.
On a more hopeful note, Germany has the privilege of having a strong industry, which is capable of handling not only its own military demands but also of becoming a pillar of the continent’s armaments capabilities. Fortunately, this front seems to have already been addressed. The new debt break plan approved by the Bundestag, along with the new 500 billion euro infrastructure fund, will boost German security capabilities with much-needed investment. Along with that, some authors have speculated how this new program may revitalize Germany’s industry, as German car companies are losing market share to Asian competitors, and delegating the production of armored vehicles to companies such as Volkswagen might be beneficial in more than one way.
The incentives and tools are set
With the United States faltering in its role as Europe’s protector, the European lack of power seems even clearer. In this situation, leaders should rise to the occasion, leading by example and setting plans. Germany has the potential to be that leader for Europe. Although not a nuclear power, such as France or the United Kingdom, Germany has the most powerful economy on the continent, alongside a very capable industry. Europe cannot be considered safe if one of its most influential players is not up to date on its issues. By organizing itself and bypassing bureaucratic constraints to its efficiency, Germany can achieve a leadership role.
They have the incentive to do so and the support of allies such as Poland and France, who are trying to address the topic of European defense more thoroughly. Besides, as Germany heads toward a change in leadership, it may take this as an opportunity to improve its security posture.
