Israel’s parliamentary election on 27 October 2026 concluded without a clear governing majority, leaving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing an uncertain political future after his governing coalition suffered a significant electoral setback. The final vote count, released by Israel’s Central Elections Committee (CEC) early Friday, October 30, confirmed that Netanyahu’s Likud-led bloc secured 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, Israel’s parliament, while the opposition alliance led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot obtained 48 seats. The remaining 19 seats went to Arab-led political parties, leaving neither of the two main blocs close to the 61 seats required to form a parliamentary majority. The results effectively end Netanyahu’s coalition’s parliamentary dominance, although they do not automatically remove him from office.
The election also carries implications beyond Israel’s domestic political landscape, particularly for its increasingly strained relationship with the European Union. Taking place amid continued diplomatic disagreements over the war in Gaza, Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, and the implementation of international humanitarian law, the election comes at a time when Brussels is reassessing the conditions of its bilateral relationship with Israel. The European Parliament’s research service has identified the election as a potentially significant turning point for EU-Israel relations, particularly given the European Union’s continued commitment to a two-state solution and its growing concerns over Israeli government policies. The EU has expressed its readiness to engage with Israel’s next government, while emphasising that future cooperation must involve frank dialogue on issues of disagreement, regional stability and a lasting peace.
The final seat distribution reflects a fragmented political landscape, with Likud emerging as the largest party despite the broader coalition’s inability to secure a majority. Netanyahu’s Likud won 27 seats, followed by Eisenkot’s Yashar party with 21 and Naftali Bennett’s B’Yachad party with 12. The Arab-led Joint List secured 11 seats, while the Democrats and Ra’am each obtained eight. Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beytenu, Otzma Yehudit and United Torah Judaism each won seven seats, while Shas and Religious Zionism secured six apiece. Several smaller parties failed to cross Israel’s 3.25 percent electoral threshold, the minimum share of votes required to enter parliament. The results represent a substantial decline for Netanyahu’s governing alliance, which previously controlled 68 seats in the outgoing Knesset but now holds only 53.
The election also recorded a turnout of 77.9 percent, the highest in decades, with 5,716,665 votes cast. Particularly significant was the increased participation of Israel’s Arab minority, whose political representation nearly doubled from 10 seats in the previous parliament to a combined 19 seats. The two Arab-led political formations, the Joint List and Ra’am, benefited from increased voter mobilisation amid widespread dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s government and its far-right political allies. Their performance constitutes an unprecedented parliamentary presence for Arab political parties, positioning them as potentially decisive actors in the negotiations over Israel’s next government. The increase in representation also reflects the growing political significance of Arab citizens within Israel’s electoral system, despite their longstanding marginalisation in national coalition politics.
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Arab citizens of Israel are Palestinians and their descendants who hold Israeli citizenship, making up approximately one-fifth of the country’s population. They include Muslims, Christians and Druze, and have the right to vote and participate in Israel’s political system. However, they have historically faced discrimination and unequal access to resources and political influence, and their representation in national governing coalitions has remained limited.
The central challenge now is forming a governing coalition. Under Israel’s parliamentary system, a government requires the support of at least 61 members of the Knesset. Although the opposition bloc and Arab-led parties together command 67 seats, their combined numerical advantage does not necessarily translate into a viable governing alliance. Eisenkot has expressed an interest in forming a new government alongside former prime minister Naftali Bennett and Democratic Party leader Yair Golan. However, significant ideological disagreements remain over cooperation with Arab political parties. While Golan has supported working with Arab representatives, other opposition figures, including Lieberman, have rejected such an arrangement. Eisenkot has also faced political constraints because of his previous commitments not to enter a formal partnership with Arab-led parties. Consequently, the opposition faces a dilemma: excluding Arab parties makes a parliamentary majority mathematically impossible without defections from Netanyahu’s camp, while including them risks alienating important Jewish opposition constituencies.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s political position remains complicated by allegations of electoral interference. After the preliminary results were announced, Likud amplified claims that Arab-led parties benefited from electoral irregularities and possible foreign interference, including allegations involving Qatar. Qatar denied the accusations, while election officials said they had no established evidence of systematic electoral violations. Opposition leader Eisenkot accused Netanyahu of trying to delegitimise the election results, suggesting the allegations were politically motivated efforts to undermine the opposition’s potential coalition-government negotiations. The controversy has further intensified tensions between Netanyahu’s political camp and Arab representatives, potentially making cross-party cooperation even more difficult. Although investigations into individual allegations continue, the Central Elections Committee has said these inquiries will not affect the published seat distribution.
Beyond the immediate coalition negotiations, the election also raises questions about the future direction of European policy towards Israel. The European Union has increasingly used its economic relationship with Israel as a means of expressing political and legal concerns over developments in Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories. In September 2025, the European Commission proposed suspending certain trade-related provisions of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, alongside targeted sanctions against extremist Israeli ministers and violent settlers. The proposal followed a review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the agreement, which establishes respect for human rights and democratic principles as an essential condition of bilateral relations. The review identified indications that Israel was in breach of these obligations, particularly in relation to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza and settlement expansion in the West Bank. However, the proposed suspension of trade concessions has not secured the necessary qualified majority among EU member states, reflecting persistent disagreements within the bloc over how far economic pressure against Israel should extend. The European Parliament’s research service has identified these unresolved measures as an important dimension of the post-election relationship.
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The EU-Israel Association Agreement is a treaty that establishes the framework for political dialogue, economic cooperation and trade relations between the European Union and Israel. Entering into force in 2000, it provides the basis for preferential trade arrangements and cooperation across various sectors. It also includes a human rights clause that makes respect for human rights and democratic principles an essential element of the agreement.
The next stage will involve consultations between political parties and President Isaac Herzog, who will act as arbiter and oversee the process of determining which politician should receive the mandate to form the next government. The final results are scheduled to be formally presented to the president on 4 November 2026, after electoral verification procedures are completed, while the newly elected Knesset is expected to convene on November 10. If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot can assemble sufficient parliamentary support, Israel could face prolonged coalition negotiations, a unity government, or eventually another election. Netanyahu’s continued premiership therefore remains possible despite his coalition’s electoral losses, particularly if opposition parties fail to overcome their ideological differences.
For European policymakers, the formation of Israel’s next government will also determine the diplomatic environment in which the EU pursues its Middle East policy. Brussels has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to a two-state solution, condemning settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and calling for humanitarian access to Gaza, Israeli withdrawal and the demilitarisation of Hamas. These positions are part of a broader European approach to regional stability, which also involves cooperation with Arab partners, support for Palestinian institutions and diplomatic engagement with the United States. The European Council’s October 2026 conclusions reiterated these commitments, highlighting the EU’s continuing concern over the humanitarian situation and the implementation of the Gaza ceasefire. Whether Israel’s next government is willing to engage with these priorities will therefore have consequences for the EU’s diplomatic relations with Jerusalem and its wider efforts to advance a negotiated settlement.
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A coalition government is formed when two or more political parties join forces to secure enough parliamentary seats to govern, usually because no single party has won an outright majority. The parties agree to cooperate and share governing responsibilities, often through negotiations over policy priorities and ministerial positions.
Commentary and opinion by the author:
The most important takeaway from this election is not necessarily Netanyahu’s electoral decline, but the contradiction between electoral arithmetic and political legitimacy in Israel’s coalition system. On paper, the opposition and Arab-led parties collectively command 67 seats, enough to form a parliamentary majority and potentially end Netanyahu’s premiership. In practice, however, the ideological boundaries separating these parties make such an arrangement politically difficult. The election has therefore produced an unusual situation in which the political camp opposing Netanyahu has more parliamentary seats collectively but may be less able to translate that advantage into governmental power.
This exposes a deeper structural problem within Israeli politics: the persistent exclusion of Arab political representation from the country’s governing coalitions. Arab citizens constitute approximately one-fifth of Israel’s population, yet their political parties have historically struggled to translate their electoral representation into meaningful participation in national government. Their 19 seats in this election are particularly consequential because they make cooperation with Arab representatives mathematically necessary for an opposition government that does not rely on defections from Netanyahu’s allies. The reluctance of several opposition politicians to work with these parties demonstrates how political exclusion can persist even when a minority community secures substantial electoral representation. In this sense, the election is not simply a contest between Netanyahu and Eisenkot; it is also a test of whether Israel’s parliamentary politics can accommodate a more inclusive understanding of political representation.
There is also an important distinction between Netanyahu losing his parliamentary majority and Netanyahu losing his political relevance. Likud remains the largest individual party, and Netanyahu retains a substantial political constituency, even after his coalition lost 15 seats compared with the outgoing parliament. His opponents may have secured enough votes to challenge his government, but their inability to agree on a common governing arrangement could ultimately preserve his position. This is precisely why describing the election as an outright victory for the opposition would be premature. Netanyahu’s political survival may depend less on winning additional public support than on his opponents’ inability to cooperate.
However, the consequences of this election extend beyond the question of who governs Israel. For the European Union, the political transition presents another test of its ability to reconcile its economic interests, diplomatic relationships and stated commitment to international law. Brussels has spent the past several years attempting to maintain its strategic relationship with Israel while simultaneously expressing increasingly serious concerns over the conduct of the war in Gaza and the expansion of settlements in the occupied West Bank. This balancing act has become particularly difficult because the EU is not simply an external observer of the conflict: it is Israel’s largest trading partner, a major humanitarian donor to Palestinians and an important diplomatic actor in the wider Middle East.
The EU-Israel relationship illustrates a broader contradiction in European foreign policy: the difficulty of translating normative commitments into consistent external action. The EU frequently positions itself as a defender of international law, human rights and multilateral institutions. These principles are also embedded in the legal framework governing its relationship with Israel, particularly Article 2 of the Association Agreement. Yet, despite the European Commission’s assessment that there are indications of breaches of these obligations, member states have struggled to reach the necessary agreement on further trade-related measures. Differences in national foreign policy priorities, historical relationships with Israel and assessments of regional security have prevented Brussels from developing a fully unified approach.
Furthermore, the election reflects broader disagreements within Israeli society that have intensified following the October 7, 2023 attacks and the subsequent effects in Gaza. Netanyahu’s government has faced mounting criticism over its handling of the security failures surrounding the attacks, the conduct of the war, Israel’s deteriorating international standing, and domestic controversies surrounding exemptions from military service for ultra-Orthodox communities. These issues have become central to the opposition’s political platform, particularly its promises of greater governmental accountability and institutional reform. The election results suggest considerable public dissatisfaction with the existing government, but they do not necessarily indicate a unified Israeli electorate in favour of a fundamentally different political direction.
Ultimately, the election shows that removing Netanyahu from office and changing Israel’s political direction are two different political challenges. Even if an alternative coalition emerges, it would inherit a deeply divided society, ongoing regional security challenges, unresolved questions surrounding the Palestinian territories, and an international reputation significantly affected by the war in Gaza. A change in government could create opportunities to reassess domestic and foreign policy, but it would not automatically translate into a transformation of Israel’s broader political or security priorities. For now, Netanyahu’s greatest political advantage may be the very fragmentation that his opponents have failed to overcome. He may have lost his majority, but his opponents have yet to demonstrate that they can govern without him.
The broader implication is that Israel’s election is not exclusively an Israeli political event. Its outcome intersects with Europe’s own debates over strategic credibility, economic leverage and the consistency of its foreign policy principles. The EU may continue to advocate dialogue and a negotiated two-state solution, but the effectiveness of that position will ultimately depend on whether its member states can translate their shared commitments into coherent diplomatic action. Netanyahu may have lost his parliamentary majority, but the questions facing both Israel and Europe extend considerably beyond the formation of its next government.
Sources: European Union External Service, European Parliament, European Commission (2), European Council, Al Jazeera (2), The Washington Post, BBC (2), Anadolu Ajansı, Times of Israel (2), Reuters, Le Monde, The National News
Author: Laksmitha Anindyanari
Info boxes provided by Laksmitha Anindyanari
News from European Relations:
ERA – No Clear Winner in Israel Parliamentary Election: Arab Parties as Kingmakers for Coalition? 04.11.2026.