The outbreak of war in Ukraine triggered an energy crisis that forced the governments of the European Union to take swift decisions to guarantee the bloc’s gas supply. Faced with the abrupt disruption of long-standing trade flows and the risk of severe shortages, European governments prioritized immediate stability over longer-term considerations. The immediate result of this was a drastic reduction in dependence on Russian-supplied gas and a shift– initially conceived as temporary– toward liquefied natural gas (LNG), mainly supplied by the United States.
Beyond immediate supply security concerns, these emergency responses also raise broader questions about the EU’s long-term strategic resilience and its capacity to maintain flexibility in its external energy relations.
Additionally, this emergency solution risks turning into a structural problem, as it may simply replace one external dependency with another, raising new economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities for the EU. What was conceived as a temporary safeguard against disruption has gradually consolidated into a lasting reconfiguration of supply patterns. According to a recent report by the Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis (IEEFA), the United States could supply up to 80% of the LNG imported by the EU by 2030.
The economic scale of the commitment reinforces this concern. In 2025, the European Union and the United States signed an energy agreement that promised up to 750 billion dollars in European purchases of American energy over the next three years. Such figures illustrate not only the depth of the transatlantic energy relationship but also the magnitude of the financial resources being redirected toward external suppliers by the European Union. 
Beyond the technical feasibility in terms of securing sufficient volumes and infrastructure to replace Russian gas in the short term, the agreement reflects a deep alignment between the EU and the US, which is increasingly shaping European energy policy in the long term. It signifies that the EU is choosing to rely on a dominant energy supplier precisely at a time when it claims it wants to diversify sources of energy and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. The apparent contradiction between the EU’s strategic discourse and contractual reality is increasingly difficult to ignore.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, American LNG has been key to stabilizing the European energy system. Its contractual flexibility and availability —based on the fact that their ships have no fixed destination and can change course in the middle of the ocean according to market needs— have helped avert supply shortages and, to some extent, cushion price volatility. In moments of acute uncertainty brought about by war on the European continent, this flexibility has proved indispensable in preventing a more severe economic disruption brought about by energy supply disruptions and rising energy prices.
However, the evolution of long-term contracts signed between European buyers and US suppliers in recent years points to a growing concentration of LNG supply. In 2025, around 57% of the LNG imported by the EU came from the United States. Unless gas demand is significantly reduced, the market share coming from the US into the European energy market could increase substantially over the next decade, further consolidating a pattern of structural dependence.
The problem is not only the concentration of supply, but also the economic and strategic implications of the growing dependence on US LNG imports. American LNG is generally more expensive than other sources of gas, both because of liquefaction and transport costs and because its price is linked to global markets where prices fluctuate significantly. These structural cost factors are unlikely to disappear in the short term.
This expensive reality has a direct impact on European industrial competitiveness, particularly in energy-intensive sectors, and makes it more difficult to keep final prices down for consumers and businesses. Over time, persistently higher energy costs risk eroding the EU’s manufacturing base, leading to widening gaps in competitiveness with other major economies.
Moreover, the growing dependence on imported American LNG runs counter to the objectives of the REPowerEU plan. This EU strategy calls for diversifying suppliers, structurally reducing gas demand, and decisively accelerating the deployment of renewables, thereby reshaping the energy mix in a more sustainable direction. However, the scale of resources committed to long-term LNG contracts limits the financial and political room to invest in generating renewables, storage, and grids, as well as improving energy efficiency. The IEEFA deal underscores the point that funds allocated to LNG imports could instead be used for the large-scale deployment of solar and wind power, reducing Europe’s exposure to price shocks and external risks while strengthening domestic capacity.
From an energy security standpoint, the prevalence of long-term LNG supply contracts also introduces an additional vulnerability: the potential instrumentalization of supply. Long-term dependence can translate into reduced strategic flexibility in times of tension. The EU’s experience with Russia over fuel supplies should serve as a warning. Energy is not merely a vital economic good, but also a tool of pressure and power. Tying a substantial share of European supply to a single partner reduces the bloc’s capacity to respond to regulatory changes, trade tensions, episodes of geopolitical rivalry, or political shifts in the supplier country. Strategic resilience requires optionality.
Turning a temporary solution into a permanent structure not only compromises the EU’s decision-making autonomy but also risks entrenching an energy model incompatible with its own transition objectives. Structural choices made under pressure can have consequences that extend far beyond the initial crisis. However, this does not imply dispensing with American LNG, which will remain an important component of the European energy mix in the coming years. The issue instead is the degree of dependence and duration, as well as the maintenance of a balance between short-term pragmatism and long-term strategy.
Europe needs a more balanced approach. Reducing gas demand through energy efficiency, electrification, and renewables is not only a climate matter, but a security strategy grounded in resilience and autonomy. Likewise, diversifying LNG suppliers, developing domestic storage capacity, and strengthening cross-border energy interconnectedness are essential to avoiding bottlenecks and critical dependencies across the single market. Energy security cannot be measured solely in terms of imported volumes, but in terms of control, diversification, and domestic capacity. It is ultimately about the ability to make sovereign choices regarding energy policy without undue external constraints.
New dependencies generate new vulnerabilities, especially when emergency decisions are conflated with long-term strategies. If the EU fails to correct this trend in time, it risks becoming exposed to new strategic vulnerabilities. The European energy transition must also be a transition toward greater strategic autonomy; otherwise, it will remain subject to the fluctuations of an increasingly uncertain and hostile global market.
