Ukraine’s path to the EU has been challenging from the beginning. Starting with internal hurdles like a refusal of a former President, Viktor Yanukovych, to sign an Association Agreement that triggered the Revolution of Dignity in 2013, finishing with the start of the full-scale war in 2022. More than a decade of struggle and effort has nevertheless brought some results. With political will within the country and the support of EU member states, Ukraine is moving quickly towards accession. However, some countries remain sceptical about this process, with Hungary at the forefront.
Hungary, under the rule of Viktor Orbán and his national conservative political party, Fidesz, has long been one of the most active opponents of Ukraine’s accession. The country has consistently used its veto power not only to block Ukraine’s EU accession but also to stop EU aid to Ukraine, with a recent example being the 90 billion euro loan package.
Despite numerous obstacles, Ukraine has successfully completed the screening process for all six negotiation clusters, and the European Commission informally opened all of them in early 2026, with formal approval still pending. This process has been further delayed by Budapest’s determination to prevent Ukraine from reaching the EU’s doorstep.
In this article, I explore Hungary’s leverage over Ukraine, its demands related to the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, its energy security concerns and ties to Russia, and the current efforts of the EU to support Ukraine’s ambitions. 
Minority Rights as Political Leverage
Hungary-Ukraine relations have been difficult in several areas. One of the most controversial issues concerns the Hungarian minority in Ukraine.
There is a large Hungarian minority in the Zakarpattia region in western Ukraine, numbering up to 150,000 people according to the last Ukrainian census of 2001. This constitutes the third-largest minority group in Ukraine. Naturally, Hungary has sought to protect this group by requiring the Ukrainian government to grant it additional rights. However, the issue has also been used as leverage against Ukraine’s EU accession. In January 2024, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó sent a list of 11 requirements that Ukraine should fulfil for Budapest to unblock the path to accession.
These demands included changes to minority and education laws. On many of the issues, the parties found compromises, and Ukraine fulfilled several of the requirements. Nevertheless, some controversial topics remain unresolved.
For example, Hungary has proposed that Ukraine adopt a system similar to that used in the Hungarian parliament, in which certain national minorities must be represented in government. In practice, this would require electoral reform in Ukraine, which would be technically impossible under martial law, as it would require a national referendum.
Another demand was for Ukraine to abolish the legal requirement for all elected officials to know the state language and use it during meetings of the councils to which they are elected. This would enable officials who do not know Ukrainian to hold public office.
The most controversial issue concerns the definition of areas with special rights for Hungarians. Current legislation allows such provisions in cities and villages with a “significant number” of minority representatives (15% or more) and with a “traditional” minority population (10% or more over the past 100 years). In these cases, the local council may decide, for example, to install road signs in two languages.
However, Hungary has demanded that all settlements in Zakarpattia be recognised as traditionally Hungarian, including areas where Hungarians have never historically lived. In addition to that, Budapest has called for the abolition of the 10% threshold. This would mean that even a minimal Hungarian presence in a particular territory would qualify it as traditionally Hungarian. According to Orban, this requirement is the crucial one for the Hungarian side. Hungary’s determination can partly be explained by its desire to preserve influence in territories where the proportion of the Hungarian population has fallen below 10%.
A similar logic can be seen in Hungary’s demand to grant Hungarian-language status to schools where at least one class is taught in Hungarian. In practice, many Hungarian parents in Ukraine send their children to Ukrainian-language schools in order to give them better opportunities to build a future in Ukraine, participate in political life, and pursue careers in the country. Budapest appears eager to halt these changes by using EU mechanisms to apply pressure on Ukraine.
While some of Hungary’s demands appear excessive, others are more reasonable. Ukraine has indeed satisfied several of Hungary’s requests and compromised on others, motivating Budapest to look for more reasons to use its veto power.
Hungarian Energy Dependence
Hungary’s antagonism towards Ukraine is closely linked to Budapest’s dependence on Russian energy sources. The Druzhba oil pipeline, which runs from Russia through Ukraine into Hungary and whose name translates as “Friendship”, hardly reflects the reality of Ukraine–Hungary relations. If anything, it has been a source of tension since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Since 2022, Hungary has increased its dependence on Russian oil from 61% pre-invasion to 92% in 2025. Moreover, Hungary profits from reselling Russian oil, enriching MOL, Hungary’s biggest oil company. Ukrainian strikes on the pipeline in Russia and interruptions in supply have therefore highlighted Hungary’s vulnerability and fuelled dissatisfaction within the country. Even the recent Russian strike on the oil hub at Brody, in western Ukraine, Hungary blamed on Ukraine, accusing it of delaying the repair. As a result, Hungary has been blocking a €90 billion credit package for Ukraine while demanding that the country continue supplying oil through the Druzhba pipeline.
Ukraine itself earns up to €200 million in transit fees through the Druzhba pipeline and does not necessarily wish to shut it down completely. However, it intends to weaken Russia’s war economy by limiting this economic stream.
After failing to diversify its energy supply, Hungary, together with Slovakia, will face further pressure following the adoption of the EU regulation aimed at prohibiting imports of Russian gas by the end of 2027 under the REPowerEU roadmap. EU member states are required to submit national diversification plans describing how they will move away from Russian gas. Countries that continue to purchase Russian oil must also submit plans to phase out Russian oil imports by 2027. Hungary has already challenged this measure in court, showing its further determination for its close ties with Russia.
Regional Alliance Against Ukraine and Hungary’s Political Future
Since a right-wing populist party has won the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, Orbán is seeking to establish an anti-Ukraine bloc with Andrej Babiš, the party’s leader, and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. This alliance would resemble the cooperation within the Visegrád Group during the migration crisis of 2014. However, Poland, traditionally part of this group, has been excluded this time due to its pro-Ukraine stance. Both Fico and Babiš share Orbán’s view about the war in Ukraine, calling for dialogue with Moscow.
Whether such an alliance will emerge may depend on Hungary’s parliamentary elections in April. Orbán’s party, Fidesz, seems to be losing to the centre-right Tisza, led by Peter Magyar, by around 10 percentage points in recent polls. For the first time in 16 years, Hungary may see a new leader in power, an outcome some observers describe as an electoral revolution. Whether it would lead to a shift in Hungary’s policy toward Ukraine remains uncertain. Peter Magyar, being a former member of Fidesz, has avoided commenting on his future plans regarding Ukraine ahead of the election. He will likely take into account the views of the Hungarian electorate, which generally opposes military support for Ukraine. Hungarians do not necessarily share the pro-Russian sentiments sometimes associated with their government, yet they are not strongly pro-Ukrainian either. Polls suggest that their orientation remains pro-European first. Nevertheless, in the event of a Tisza victory, there may be an opportunity for constructive dialogue between Hungary and Ukraine, as well as a fresh start in their relationship after 16 years of the Orbán era.
EU Dimension
The main arena of contestation between Ukraine and Hungary lies in the issue of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Although Budapest supported granting Ukraine candidate status, Hungary has been one of the most consistent opponents to Ukraine’s membership and its main obstacle. Under EU treaties, member states have the right to block enlargement, and Hungary has been willing to use this power.
Ukraine has nevertheless been progressing rapidly. In June 2022, it received candidate status, and in December 2023, accession negotiations were formally opened. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has expressed the ambition to complete the negotiations clusters by the end of 2026.
Hungary, however, has been consistently delaying or blocking Ukraine’s accession process. In addition to that, Budapest’s rhetoric has become more hostile, whether it is a concern about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine or a warning that Hungary’s money will be spent on Ukraine in case of accession, potentially harming Hungarian workers.
This situation has prompted the EU to reconsider aspects of its accession process, which makes it inefficient. One of the solutions is to remove the requirement for unanimous approval when opening each negotiation cluster or chapter. This rule makes the whole process easy to undermine due to the political motivation of individual member states.
EU Responses to Hungary’s Obstruction
As Ukraine’s accession process is far from complete, the EU has been looking for new ways to reduce Hungary’s ability to block progress. The idea of circumventing Hungary’s veto is not new, but the majority of the ideas have so far proved unsuccessful.
One such idea is to decouple the accession processes of Ukraine and Moldova, even though both countries have fulfilled the requirements to open the first cluster of negotiations. This would allow Moldova to advance its application while Ukraine remains blocked by Hungary’s veto. Kyiv has strongly criticised this proposal, arguing that it would increase Ukraine’s isolation while serving Hungary’s interests. The EU appears to be against it as well, emphasising the importance of maintaining unity in the enlargement process.
Another option is the suspension of Hungary’s voting rights under Article 7 of the EU Treaty, a mechanism designed for member states that violate the core values of the EU. However, this procedure is lengthy and politically difficult. Although it can be triggered by one third of member states, it ultimately requires unanimity among the others, making it unlikely that such a step would succeed.
The President of the European Council, António Costa, has suggested allowing negotiation clusters to be opened with the support of a qualified majority of EU member states rather than by unanimous decision. He sees enlargement as “the most important geopolitical investment the European Union can make in the future of peace and stability in Europe”. This idea, however, did not find a consensus among EU states.
The only mechanism that has worked so far is an initiative, known as “frontloading”, launched by Denmark just 20 days before the end of its EU Council presidency. Introduced by Denmark’s Minister for European Affairs, Marie Bjerre, shortly before Cyprus assumed the presidency, this mechanism allows negotiations to begin without formally opening the accession clusters. Under the usual procedure, opening each of the six clusters requires unanimous approval from all member states. The first cluster to be opened and the last to be closed is the Fundamentals cluster.
Thanks to the new approach, in mid-December 2025, the EU handed over to Ukraine its Draft common position (DCP) on three clusters: Fundamentals, Internal Market, and External Relations. This means Ukraine has received the technical information it needs to continue its reforms. The approach allows technical discussions to begin and may enable almost simultaneous opening and closing of clusters, once and if Hungary lifts its blockade. Later, in March 2026, Ukraine received benchmarks for three remaining clusters – Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth, Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, and Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion Policy – marking a major milestone in Ukraine’s accession.
It is the first time the EU has shared Draft Common Positions with candidate countries before formal negotiations on clusters have begun. This step highlights the growing recognition that the current enlargement process requires reform, which is an issue that EU member states have long been debating.
Conclusion: Veto Power, Reform Pressures, and Future Prospects
Budapest has emerged as the principal antagonist in Ukraine’s EU accession process. Hungary’s primary advantage lies in its veto power, which it has used effectively to slow Ukraine’s progress and pursue its own political objectives, including demands for internal reforms in Ukraine that would benefit the Hungarian side.
Hungary’s dependence on Russia’s oil and gas adds another dimension to Ukraine-Hungary relations, further deepening the antagonism between the countries.
Orban’s political decisions have generated frustration among other EU member states and revived discussions about the need for internal reforms within the Union. In particular, there are growing calls to streamline decision-making procedures and prevent the abuse of veto powers in the enlargement process. In the meantime, “frontloading” has been used to advance Ukraine’s integration into the EU, although it remains a temporary solution.
At the same time, the upcoming elections in Hungary in April raise the possibility of a shift in policy. Should a new government come to power, Hungary’s approach towards Ukraine, and towards EU enlargement more broadly, may change.
