The war in Ukraine has entered its fourth year, fundamentally reshaping the political, security, and economic landscape of the region and the balance of power. As the conflict evolved into a war of attrition, the allied states have faced increased pressure to provide maximal support to their partners, potentially permanently altering the status quo. Unlike other Russian allies, Belarus faced a difficult strategic dilemma in this war, which has become increasingly difficult to manage and sustain. Belarus’s dependence on Russia allowed it to sustain the regime amid Western isolation, but deeper engagement in the conflict could expose the regime to military setbacks, further economic isolation, as well as renewed domestic instability and volatility. The bilateral relationship and partnership that long allowed Lukashenko to preserve power and economic dependence, and to stand in isolation, could potentially become a source of vulnerability. Any escalation along Ukraine’s northern border involving Belarus would carry significant risks for the regime of Alexander Lukashenko.
An Alliance of Dependence
The relationship between Belarus and Russia dates back to the post-Soviet order, particularly to the establishment of the Union State framework in 1999. A major turning point came when Russia scaled up its support for Lukashenko after disputing the 2020 elections and his unscrupulous stay in power, substantially deepening the engagement between the two states. In return, Belarus has provided Moscow with critical strategic advantages, including territory, military infrastructure, intelligence, logistical support, access to defense-industrial capacity, and a launchpad to attack Ukraine. Moscow’s military deployment in Belarus transformed it into a strategic launchpad for military operations, further embedding Belarus in the military-industrial and security architecture. It has reshaped into a more conventional bilateral alliance with Moscow, providing the central regime stability to Lukashenko’s regime, with Belarus providing strategic depth and access to Eastern Europe. Yet, this interdependence is asymmetric, and Minsk has greater economic, financial, and security dependence on Moscow, narrowing the options for independent security and foreign policy.
Lukashenko Balancing Act
Yet, despite his extensive support for Moscow, Lukashenko has refrained from directly deploying Belarusian ground forces in Ukraine or maintaining a forward military posture along the Ukrainian border intended to deter Ukraine. The strategic decision stopped for opening a new military front, with the aim of preventing Ukrainian troops from entering Belarusian territory, although escalation chances remain high. Belarus’ preliminary participation and cooperation with Russia in violating Ukrainian sovereignty have contributed to its emergence as a Ukrainian national security threat perception in Ukraine. The apparent contradiction of restraining direct intervention is one of the central components in understanding Lukashenko’s strategy.
Lukashenko’s objective, therefore, is not to distance Belarus from Russia, but to support Moscow by all means without exposing Belarus to the full consequences of the war. This calculation is essentially reflected and supported by the assessment of Karim Pedersen1, Head of International Communications in the Office of President Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Belarus’s democratically elected president. In response to the question on analysis, Pedersen argued that “Lukashenko understands that participation in the war would be deeply unpopular, including among people who do not openly support the democratic movement.” Henceforth, direct intervention could consequently generate domestic discontent, heavy casualties, additional sanctions, and greater international isolation. This reflects a central strategy of Minsk’s regime, where Lukashenko is willing to support Moscow where necessary to gain support and preserve his regime, but he has the stimulus to resist measures that can put the survival of his regime at greater risk. 
Military Vulnerability in the Scenario of Escalation
Belarusian ground troops would fundamentally change the role of Minsk in the conflict. Such involvement would further damage its standing in Europe and potentially increase its isolation, while directly exposing Belarusian territory and military infrastructure to Ukrainian military operations. Moreover, this would place additional pressure on Belarus’s defence capabilities and military posture. The key issue, however, would not simply be whether Belarus possesses sufficient military capacity, but whether its armed forces could sustain prolonged warfare without incurring significant casualties, logistical pressures, and institutional strain.
Direct military participation could produce an unsettling outcome for Lukashenko, with substantial military losses and less capability to alter the course of war. Moreover, the war will expose the Belarusian Armed Forces to the test of the willingness of conscripts and officers to participate in a war that many Belarusians may not perceive as their own, with potentially low morale. As Pedersen reflected, “Deploying troops would weaken the country’s own defenses, expose the limitations of its armed forces, and potentially provoke disobedience among soldiers who do not regard Ukraine as their enemy.”
The Cost of Domestic Stability
The domestic consequences for Lukashenko’s regime could be even more severe and significant, given that his political survival is heavily dependent on control over institutions and preventing renewed mass mobilization. Any involvement in the war could challenge the stability that Lukashenko claims to bring, as human and infrastructure costs during conflict could directly affect Belarusian society. Casualties on the ground would make the war increasingly challenging to portray as a distant geopolitical reality. Public dissatisfaction and discontent would increase among the public and the families of conscripts once wounded or deceased soldiers returned from the battlefield. Mobilizing conscripts for a war widely perceived as Russia’s rather than Belarus’s could further undermine morale and public support. Compared with Russia, Belarus has also historically exhibited weaker forms of outward nationalism, particularly during the post-independence period. This has been shaped significantly by Lukashenko’s authoritarianism and repression.
This dynamic is partly rooted in Soviet-era Russification and a state identity promoted by Lukashenko on a pro-Russian and neo-Soviet political model. Nevertheless, societal resistance remains an important constraint despite the regime’s arrests and dismantling of formal opposition. Pedersen assessed that “a stable majority of Belarusians opposes further military escalation and does not want Belarusian soldiers sent to fight against Ukraine.” Opposition to the war was pointed out by Karim in the form of 2022 railway workers and local resistance disrupting infrastructure used to transport Russian forces and equipment towards Ukraine. These episodes suggest that the absence of opposition inside Belarus does not necessarily mean the inevitable absence of societal resistance. For Lukashenko, direct entry into the Ukraine war could therefore transform passive opposition into a more active source of instability.
Regime-Survival Calculation
Lukashenko’s central strategic calculation is to avoid direct confrontation with Kyiv while maintaining close relations with Moscow. As Pedersen indicated, “Lukashenko’s primary objective is not loyalty to Russia but the survival of his own regime.” His assessment captures the central paradox of Belarusian foreign and security policy. Where Lukashenko depends on Russia for regime survival, yet that same dependence requires him to retain sufficient autonomy to avoid decisions that could expose Belarus to the costs of war. As Karim Pedersen cautioned, “This should not be mistaken for neutrality. The regime allowed Russian troops to invade Ukraine from Belarusian territory and continues to provide Russia with military infrastructure, logistical support, and industrial capacity.” Belarusian support for Russia contributed to Ukraine’s perception of Belarus as a national security threat. Lukashenko’s restraint should therefore not be interpreted as a rejection of Russia’s war, but as a form of selective alignment: supporting Moscow sufficiently to preserve the relationship and sustain the Belarusian economy, while avoiding direct military confrontation.
Strategic Autonomy: Tactical Rather Than Strategic
The post-2020 period and Russia’s war against Ukraine have strengthened Russian-Belarusian economic and financial ties while further reducing Belarus’s strategic autonomy. Dependence on Russia has contributed to Belarus’s diplomatic isolation, while Western sanctions have constrained the country’s ability to develop alternative economic partnerships. Yet dependence does not eliminate Minsk’s agency, as Lukashenko has demonstrated an ability to delay, resist, and modify Russian demands when he considers them harmful to his interests. One of the clearest examples is the refusal to deploy Belarusian ground forces to make deterrence against Ukraine. Pedersen describes the situation as “tactical rather than strategic” autonomy. Where Lukashenko has some room to maneuver over individual decisions, but Belarus’ broader strategic direction depends upon Russia. Minsk can resist particular Russian demands without possessing the capacity to fundamentally reshape the relationship.
The Regional Security Arena
Any Belarusian military intervention in Ukraine would extend beyond the relationship between Minsk and Moscow. The opening of a Belarusian front would create additional military pressure along Ukraine’s northern border and potentially force Kyiv to redirect forces and resources. Diverting Ukrainian forces and resources from the frontline to the northern border of Belarus is one of the major strategies of the Kremlin in a bid to expand the front and ease the pressure in Eastern Ukraine. For the European Union and NATO, any participation by Lukashenko would only lead to the further militarization of the region and NATO’s eastern flank. It could also trigger additional sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime and accelerate Belarus’s strategic integration into Russia’s security architecture. The paradox for Belarus is that any attempt to strengthen Russia’s military position could ultimately reduce Minsk’s own room for maneuver. As Pedersen noted, “Sending Belarusian troops into Ukraine would create considerable political and military risks while offering him [Lukashenko] few clear benefits.” The opening of any northern front and military involvement would likely increase Western pressure, deepening Minsk’s dependence on Moscow, and perplexing the diplomatic and political opening to re-engage with Europe. The consequences of entering the war would extend beyond the battlefield. The Lukashenko regime increasingly risks making Belarus embedded in the Russian security architecture, with reduced prospects of an independent Belarusian foreign and security policy.
The European Dilemma
The European response is a complex one. Continued pressure on Minsk remains necessary because Belarus has facilitated Russian aggression from its territory and because the Lukashenko regime continues to repress its own population. Meanwhile, any EU policies that isolate the Belarusian society can deepen dependence on Moscow. The EU should therefore distinguish between the Belarusian regime and Belarusian society by supporting independent media, civil society, the democratic force led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and ordinary Belarusians, while maintaining maximum pressure on the institutions responsible for repression and support for Russia. As it will allow for the political and strategic future of Belarus with Europe. The objective of the democratic movement of Belarus and the EU should not be to punish Minsk, but to prevent Belarus from being permanently absorbed into Moscow’s strategic future. As Pedersen stated, “European policy towards Belarus should not simply be treated as an extension of policy towards Russia. Belarus has its own society, national interests, and democratic movement. Abandoning the country to Moscow would create greater long-term insecurity for Ukraine and Europe.”
The Alliance of Vulnerability
Ultimately, Lukashenko’s relationship with Moscow is defined by a paradox. Russia has provided the political, economic, and security support to Belarus since Lukashenko came to power in 1994, surviving the deepest crisis of sanctions since independence. In return, Belarus has transformed and become a strategic asset of Moscow, with Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, and is facilitating the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yet, the deeper Belarus engages in Ukraine, the greater the possibility that the cost of the alliance begins to outweigh the benefits for Lukashenko. Direct intervention in Ukraine is a quagmire that could expose it to military losses, economic isolation, domestic resistance, and greater strategic vulnerability. It will expose Lukashenko’s structural message and image of stability that have long helped him consolidate his political control. As Pedersen reflected, “Politically, intervention would undermine the regime’s remaining promise of peace and stability.”
The central conundrum for Lukashenko’s regime is not whether Belarus can align with Moscow, but how far that alignment can protect the regime before it begins to threaten. For now, Lukashenko appears to bridge a narrow line by supporting the Kremlin without full-scale warfare, sustaining his dependence without renouncing tactical and strategic autonomy, and securing his alliance with Russia without placing the survival of his autocratic regime at the mercy of the battlefield.
- For this article, the author conducted a written interview with Karim Pedersen, Head of International Communications in the Office of President Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Belarus’s democratically elected president in 2020 ↩︎
