The European Commission wants a more capable border agency with stronger powers over returns, crisis response and online monitoring. The expansion of Frontex has since always raised human rights concerns, and the question also arises now: How can we strengthen institutions without losing control over them?
The European Commission’s proposal of 27 October would give Frontex more personnel capacities, a stronger role in organising returns and new capabilities to monitor publicly accessible social media. It would also enable the agency to support returns between non-European countries. With this proposal a debate over the relationship between operational power and accountability was opened. While Commission presented a stronger agency as necessary for effective migration management, facing crisis like in Ceuta, critics question whether the protective measures governing its activities would keep pace.
The reform still remains a proposal and is going through its preparatory parliamentary phase – if it will be adopted depends on negotiations between Parliament and the Council.
A Bigger Role for Europe’s Border Agency
Troughout several enforcement laws in the last years, Frontex already won substantial operational responsibilities. The 2019 reform strengthened its mandate and established a standing corps with the goal to reach 10,000 operational personnel by 2027. However, the European Court of Auditors’ 2021 assessment found shortcomings in the implementation of earlier responsibilities, which underlined once more that expanding a mandate and delivering it are separate challenges.
According to the European Migration Network’s summary, the new proposal would gradually increase the available corps to 30,000 by 2041, which would comprise 6,000 agency personnel, 7,000 personnel provided by member states and a 17,000-strong reserve. Further, the proposal would establish a Return Coordination Centre, a Quick Reaction Force and an Online Monitoring and Response Centre.
The proposed strengthening draws mainly on the events in Ceuta in the late summer 2026. In September a five-point-plan got published, calling for better early warning and stronger crisis response. Accordingly, the EU Commission justifies the proposed reform with the need to anticipate emergencies, respond to organised smuggling and address attempts to manipulate migration movements. Especially, the last objective seems unnecessary, against a background of declining recorded irregular crossings in the last months. Frontex reported irregular crossings in the first 9 months of 2026, one-third below the corresponding period of 2025. This contradiction makes it even more important to explain which operational gaps the proposed expansion would address and how its effectiveness would be assessed over a long-term period.
Returns Beyond EU Borders
The proposed role, to provide support in returns between non-EU countries, so called “third countries” is particularly consequential.
The designated tasks encompass planning, operational activities, and reintegration, with activities in third countries being subject to the respective agreements and applicable legal obligations.
This builds on a separate, highly contested development: the Council’s adoption of new EU return rules on 1 October, which allows arrangements for return hubs outside the Union, even if it cannot be guaranteed that human rights standards can be upheld on the ground. Although the current proposal and the already-agreed-upon framework for return centers in third countries are two separate matters, they are often conflated in the criticism directed at them.
Amnesty International argues that the proposed reform risks increasing EU involvement in abuses beyond its territory without corresponding improvements in transparency and safeguards. Even if the Commission states that fundamental rights must be met, monitoring of the actual processes in the return hubs will show whether these intentions can be upheld. On an administrative level, in particular, questions arise such as: “Which authorities investigate allegations, what legal remedies are available to individuals, and at what point is a decision made to cease the operation of a return center?”
Who Holds Frontex Accountable?
Frontex already has an independent Fundamental Rights Officer, monitors and a complaints procedure. Furthermore, under Article 46 of the existing regulation, serious or persistent rights violations can require the withdrawal of funding or the suspension or termination of activities. However, reporting on the parliamentary discussion of 4 November, Agence Europe described support from several conservative and right-wing MEPs for central elements of the expansion. Other members questioned safeguards for third-country operations and changes to internal monitoring. Commissioner Magnus Brunner defended the proposal’s rights framework.
A 2026 report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights demonstrates that this debate is not unfounded. According to the report, out of 53 incidents referred to national authorities by the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, only six were investigated by independent national bodies or courts. Many of the allegations concern national officials operating as part of Frontex missions.
Furthermore, reports continue to emerge regarding cooperation with African border authorities, the hindrance of European search-and-rescue organizations, and violent pushbacks.
Online monitoring creates another accountability question. Farah Karimi, chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s migration committee, has warned about privacy, freedom of expression and the risk of conflating legitimate communication with criminal activity. Her intervention calls for clear limits on data collection and independent scrutiny.
Why This Matters for Europe
The reform would shape how the EU exercises operational authority at its borders and through cooperation beyond them (e.g. with border authorities from non-EU countries). Its significance extends from migration management to the distribution of responsibility between European institutions, national governments and third countries.
A larger agency could improve coordination and readiness and make migration management easier for European institutions and authorities. Those benefits remain outcomes to demonstrate. On the other side, strong concerns about expanded powers and their potential lack of control, should be assessed through the specific rules governing monitoring, investigation and remedies.
The central institutional challenge lies in ensuring that, during joint operations, responsibilities are not delegated to non-European actors; instead, it must be guaranteed that European standards are upheld even within return centers located abroad. The enhanced operational capacity that Frontex would gain through the proposed reform will only lend the institution greater credibility if individuals, oversight bodies, and legislators are able to track and verify responsibilities, actions, and processes.
What to Watch Next
It is still on the Parliament and the Council to develop their positions, before any further assessments can be donde. The most consequential negotiations will concern third-country operations, the independence and scope of rights monitoring, and the safeguards surrounding rapid deployment. The concrete personnel and financing arrangements and provided resources will then determine how much of the proposed capacity becomes operational. If the proposal gets adopted, the programmes measurement will be have to be whether it delivers effective border management and more effective crisis response alongside enforceable accountability and secured human rights standards.
Sources:
European Commission – Commission proposes a stronger Frontex: more resources, a greater role on returns and effective crisis response. 27 October 2026.
European Parliament – European Border and Coast Guard (recast): Procedure 2026/0342(COD). Legislative Observatory.
European Union – Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard. 13 November 2019.
European Court of Auditors – Frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date. Special Report 08/2021.
European Migration Network Belgium – European Commission proposes to strengthen Frontex’s role in border management and returns.
European Commission – Staying the course on migration reform. 2 October 2026.
Council of the European Union – Council adopts new rules on return for those with no right to stay in the EU. 1 October 2026.
Agence Europe – Reform of Frontex – European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties calls for clear fundamental rights safeguards. 5 November 2026.
Amnesty International – EU: Frontex reform compounds risk of EU complicity in rights violations. 28 October 2026.
Amnesty International – EU: ‘Return hub’ plans in Rwanda and Uganda risk becoming ‘cruel black holes’ for human rights. 2 September 2026.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – Planned return hubs in third countries: EU fundamental rights law issues. 6 February 2025.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – EU-mandated migration-related fundamental rights monitoring and investigations – 2026 Update.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – Migration and Fundamental Rights Bulletin – 1/2026.
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – OSCE PA Migration Committee Chair calls for human rights safeguards on proposed Frontex social media monitoring. 30 October 2026.
Human Rights Watch – EU: Frontex Complicit in Abuse in Libya. 12 December 2022.
Médecins Sans Frontières – New MSF report denounces violence and obstruction of lifesaving response in the Central Mediterranean. 12 June 2025.
AI Transparency Note: Artificial intelligence was used to support research, source comparison and the structuring of this briefing. Editorial decisions, source selection and the final assessment remain subject to human review.
