Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal faces competing claims to its leadership. As Donald Tusk seeks to restore judicial independence, new legal disputes raise questions about constitutional legitimacy and Europe’s response.
Poland’s constitutional crisis escalated on 30 October when newly appointed judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended the leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal. The confrontation has intensified the struggle between Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-European coalition, President Karol Nawrocki and the opposition Law and Justice party (PiS). The central question is whether judicial independence can be restored through procedures whose legality is itself disputed.
A Court with Competing Leaderships
Korwin-Piotrowska ordered a one-month suspension of Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski and Vice-President Bartłomiej Sochański. She assumed responsibility for the court’s management after Nawrocki had refused to receive the oaths of several judges elected by parliament and Święczkowski had prevented them from exercising their duties. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) criticised both the obstruction and the subsequent intervention.
Korwin-Piotrowska invoked provisions governing the temporary suspension of judges, applying them to the Constitutional Tribunal through references to other judicial legislation. Her reasoning also relied on an asserted state of constitutional necessity. However, legal experts dispute whether these provisions authorise her intervention. The legal arguments raise broader questions about judicial independence and constitutional safeguards.
The conflict intensified on 3 November when eight judges attended a General Assembly and approved the tribunal’s 2027 budget. They interpreted quorum requirements as excluding the two suspended judges and another judge whose appointment was disputed. Critics rejected that interpretation, arguing that the constitutionally required quorum was not met. The proceedings and competing claims illustrate the institution’s continuing paralysis.
On 6 November, the Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over appeals lodged by Święczkowski and Sochański and referred the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal. The decision did not determine whether their suspension was lawful. Korwin-Piotrowska also issued new administrative restrictions concerning the court’s operations and access to its premises.
A Decade of Political Conflict
The dispute dates back to 2015, when PiS challenged judicial appointments made before it took office. During eight years in government, the party introduced reforms it presented as necessary to improve accountability. Critics argued that these measures weakened judicial independence and increased political influence over the courts. The European Court of Human Rights has documented extensive litigation arising from Poland’s judicial reforms.
Tusk’s coalition, in power since December 2023, promised to reverse these changes. Nawrocki’s election complicated those efforts by adding another institutional opponent. The conflict is increasingly linked to Poland’s 2027 parliamentary election, with both political camps presenting themselves as defenders of the constitution.
Poland’s judicial crisis also reflects broader tensions surrounding democratic backsliding, populism and Euroscepticism. During its years in government, PiS presented its judicial reforms as necessary to restore accountability and defend national sovereignty. European institutions and independent legal observers, however, identified serious threats to judicial independence and democratic checks and balances. PiS has frequently framed EU criticism as interference in Poland’s constitutional affairs, portraying itself as a defender of the national legal order. This sovereignty-based rhetoric has reinforced tensions between European legal obligations and domestic political legitimacy, although criticism of EU intervention does not necessarily imply opposition to EU membership.
Nawrocki accused the government of undermining Poland’s constitutional order. In a statement on 3 November, he argued:
“The rule of law cannot be restored through methods that themselves flagrantly violate the law.”
Tusk rejected any accusations before. In a statement published on 2 November, he insisted:
“The President recognises the judges legally elected by the Sejm, because the Constitution so stipulates, and they assume their duties in the Tribunal.”
Both quotations are English translations of statements originally made in Polish.
The government’s concerns have a legal basis. On 3 November, Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office announced applications to lift the judicial immunity of Święczkowski and Sochański over alleged misconduct, including obstruction of newly appointed judges. These remain allegations, not established criminal guilt.
Yet the intervention’s legality also requires scrutiny. The ICJ criticised Nawrocki’s refusal to receive judges’ oaths while warning that suspending the tribunal’s leadership without an appropriate legal procedure could undermine judicial independence.
The challenge is therefore to restore an independent tribunal without creating a precedent that future governments could use to remove judges through contested procedures.
Why This Matters for Europe
Poland’s constitutional crisis raises fundamental questions about its obligations under the EU treaties, which bind all member states. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union establishes the rule of law as a founding value, while Article 19 requires effective judicial protection in fields covered by EU law. Under the principle of primacy, binding EU law takes precedence over conflicting national provisions within its scope. In its December 2025 judgment in Commission v Poland, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal failed to meet the requirements of judicial independence and impartiality and that its rejection of EU law primacy violated Poland’s treaty obligations. Although the judgment does not automatically establish the illegality of President Nawrocki’s subsequent actions, his refusal to administer oaths to newly elected judges raises further questions about compliance with European judicial standards.
European legal institutions have separately addressed the obstruction of newly elected judges. The Venice Commission concluded in October that Poland’s president should receive their oaths without undue delay. The ICJ also referred to interim measures issued by the European Court of Human Rights in May requiring Polish authorities not to obstruct four judges from exercising their duties.
The European Commission has supported parliament’s constitutional authority to appoint judges while emphasising compliance with national constitutional requirements and European judgments. Brussels has not treated the dispute as a matter of political preference alone.
These institutions perform different functions. The EU’s Court of Justice interprets binding EU law, while the Venice Commission and the European Court of Human Rights operate within the Council of Europe’s framework. Their findings can reinforce the case for reform without automatically validating every domestic measure used to achieve it.
The dispute also illustrates the limits of top-down Europeanization. Through its case law, the Court of Justice has strengthened the integration of national legal systems into the EU legal order, requiring member states to adapt domestic practices to European obligations. Yet legal pressure from Brussels and Luxembourg does not necessarily produce domestic institutional change. Poland’s continuing confrontation demonstrates how domestic political resistance can complicate the implementation of European judgments. Whether this top-down approach can help restore judicial independence in Poland remains uncertain, particularly while national institutions disagree over the legitimacy of the reforms themselves.
The EU’s credibility depends on applying consistent legal standards. Having challenged PiS-era interference, Brussels must also assess Tusk’s government independently. Supporting judicial independence should not become unconditional support for a politically aligned administration.
What to Watch Next
Tusk has offered talks with Nawrocki to ease tensions. Whether negotiations can resolve the competing claims to the tribunal’s leadership remains uncertain.
The next legal questions concern the suspension appeals, disciplinary proceedings and the validity of decisions taken by the disputed General Assembly. The Supreme Court’s jurisdictional decision leaves the central legal controversy unresolved.
For the EU, the most defensible approach is to insist on compliance with European judgments, support transparent constitutional procedures and apply the same standards regardless of which party governs Poland. Political compromise may be necessary, but it cannot replace legal safeguards.
Poland’s constitutional crisis tests whether restoring the rule of law can itself remain firmly grounded in law.
Transparency Note: AI-assisted. Reviewed by the Briefing Team.
