The war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe’s public policy landscape, accelerating changes across security and defense policies, energy strategy, and migration. This article explores how the conflict has served as a catalyst, compelling the European Union and its Member States to confront questions related to the effectiveness of their current policies.
The shift in the security and defense policies in the EU
The lack of a uniform voice in the EU regarding its security and defense policies has led to the creation of gaps in these areas, which were exposed as a result of the Ukrainian-Russian war. To fill them and strengthen the outdated CFSP, the EU implemented several new measures. These include:
1. Strategic Compass
While being perceived as a ‘guide to action’ that allows the development of a cohesive and defined plan of action that ‘accelerates’ the operational side of the CFSP, it still fails to grant the EU ‘one single voice’ to address the prevailing security issues. First of all, it does not grant the EU the required strategic autonomy to effectively defend its member states. Achieving a unanimous assessment of common threats does not, by itself, provide the EU with the ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, to respond to international crises’. Secondly, it does not change the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, making the EU rely on the decisions of its Member States and unanimity to make any significant decisions. Even though unanimity is an important aspect of the EU as a whole, when it comes to security and defense policies, it can hinder the EU’s effectiveness by slowing down the decision-making process.
2. The utilization of the enhanced European Peace Facility (EPF) for military support to Ukraine
European Peace Facility, approved in March 2021, is a financial instrument designed to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security in line with Article 21(2)(c) TEU. It empowers the Council to take decisions by unanimity whenever the international security scenario demands and pooling national resources into a common fund for the implementation of those CFSP decisions. EPF has become an important instrument of financing the EU’s military response to the war in Ukraine by advancing the CFSP and bolstering the EU’s security influence in Europe. 
3. The launch of the EU-led Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM UA) to train Ukrainian soldiers
It is the EU-led, non-executive CSDP military mission which aims to ‘contribute to enhancing the military capability of Ukraine’s Armed Forces (UAF)’. The articles that the EUMAM UA falls under allow the Council to decide unanimously on CSDP missions that include military advice and assistance tasks to third countries. Being the first EU land-based military operation, it has become the world’s largest provider of military training to Ukraine.
4. The development of the proposal to complement the EU Cybersecurity Act and the Network and Information Security Directive
The Ukraine-Russian war has led to an upsurge of cyberattacks from Russia, creating vulnerabilities in technology infrastructures, especially within the European Union (EU). The majority of attacks were from the civilian hacktivist groups acting with political motives. These cyber attacks highlighted the EU’s weaker areas and led to the proposal of a Regulation mandating cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software products with digital elements connected to devices or networks in 2022. After several amendments, a consensus on horizontal cybersecurity requirements was reached in 2023, allowing negotiations with the European Parliament on the legislation’s final version to commence.
To sum up, the war in Ukraine has brought into light the longstanding weaknesses in the EU’s security and defense approach into sharp focus. In response, the EU has taken several important steps, such as adopting the Strategic Compass, utilizing the European Peace Facility, launching EUMAM UA, and pushing forward cybersecurity legislation. These actions show a clear intent to strengthen collective defense and increase resilience. However, despite these efforts, challenges remain. Since the EU still depends heavily on unanimous decisions from its Member States, the ability to act swiftly in times of crisis can still be questioned.
The shift in the energy strategy of the EU as a response to the ongoing war
One of the EU’s main strategies in supporting Ukraine was through sanctions. However, to do so, the EU had to amend its energy strategies since Ukraine serves as a transit country for Russian natural gas exports to Europe (with approximately 40% of Europe’s gas imports passing through Ukrainian pipelines). The diversification of gas has led to a 10% increase in imports from other countries, such as Qatar. According to Eurostat data, there is a significant decline in Russia’s share of EU energy imports by more than 10 percentage points, dropping from 25.5% to 15.1% between the first and third quarters of 2022.
In conclusion, the war in Ukraine has significantly influenced the EU’s energy strategy, compelling a rapid and strategic shift away from dependence on Russian energy sources. As part of its broader support for Ukraine and response to Russian aggression, the EU implemented sanctions that necessitated energy diversification. These changes reflect the EU’s commitment to strengthening energy security, reducing geopolitical vulnerabilities, and building a more resilient and independent energy infrastructure. It is worth mentioning that this is not the only sanction imposed on Russia by the EU – overall, there are 18 packages that are officially published in the EU Official Journal.
Migration
The topic of migration has been relevant in Europe long before the start of the war. Member States tend to respond to this highly sensitive topic on a local level first, before any negotiations in the EU. However, in 2022, following the Russian attacks on Ukraine, the EU implemented a comprehensive migration management strategy to welcome refugees. The strategy includes the introduction of the Temporary Protection Directive. It establishes rights for individuals under temporary protection, providing practical information through a multilingual webpage and a dedicated helpline, and coordinating efforts through the Solidarity Platform. The Solidarity Platform involves EU countries, Schengen Associated States, EU Agencies, international partners, and civil society organizations. Its objectives include facilitating discussions, collecting information on reception capacity, coordinating offers from EU countries, and utilizing relevant EU instruments.
Thus, while migration has long been a complex and locally managed issue within the EU, the influx of refugees due to the war in Ukraine prompted a more unified and strategic response at the European level. The implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive and the establishment of the Solidarity Platform demonstrate the EU’s commitment to coordinated and practical migration management. The EU has created a more structured framework to address migration challenges collectively, reinforcing solidarity among Member States and ensuring protection for those in need.
Conclusion
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a profound reflection point for the European Union, exposing structural vulnerabilities while simultaneously accelerating policy innovation across key domains. In the realm of security and defense, the EU has taken notable steps, such as the introduction of the Strategic Compass and the operationalisation of the European Peace Facility, to address long-standing deficits in coherence and capability. However, these efforts remain constrained by institutional limitations, particularly the reliance on unanimity and the intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The conflict has also necessitated a rapid reconfiguration of the EU’s energy strategy. The sharp reduction in reliance on Russian imports and the diversification of supply sources underscore a broader effort to decouple European energy security from geopolitical risk. This strategic shift not only responds to immediate needs but also aligns with the EU’s longer-term goals of sustainability and resilience.
Regarding the topic of migration, the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive and the establishment of the Solidarity Platform represent a significant departure from previous fragmented approaches. These measures reflect a more coordinated and structured response to forced displacement, rooted in the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility.
Taken together, these developments suggest that while the EU’s response has been neither uniform nor without challenges, the war in Ukraine has nonetheless catalyzed meaningful movement toward more integrated and strategic policymaking. Whether these changes will be sustained or institutionalized in the long term depends on continued political will and the capacity of EU institutions to evolve in the face of complex and evolving geopolitical realities.
