Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ increasing strategic uncertainty toward Europe, the EU has made significant strides in strengthening its defence posture over the past year. Through the White Paper and the Readiness Roadmap 2030, Member States have mobilised up to €800 billion for defence, including €150 billion for joint procurement under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme. This funding has supported a wide range of initiatives, from expanding the European defence industrial base to targeted investments in drone and space capabilities, all of which help reduce Europe’s dependence on the United States for conventional defence.
Most recently, €38 billion in low-interest, long-term loans was released through SAFE to eight countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and Romania). These efforts have been complemented by the introduction of new policies under the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), the Communication on Defence Industry Transformation, and the Military Mobility Package.
However, despite these advances in funding and capacity-building, Europe still lacks a clear mechanism for coordinating forces and enabling rapid crisis response. The EU’s current defence decision-making structure requires unanimous approval from all 27 Member States, a process that is inherently slow and unwieldy. As EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius noted in his speech at the Folk och Försvar National Conference 2026, injecting funds into an old defence architecture is insufficient to deliver the qualitative transformation Europe requires. What is needed, he argued, is a structure that enables Europe to fight as a unified force rather than as a collection of national armies.
Kubilius identified the lack of political and operational unity as a central weakness in Europe’s defence posture, one not addressed by current reform efforts. Because the EU CSDP relies on unanimity in military decision-making, and because the United States retains significant influence within NATO, Europe remains slow to respond to emerging crises, including recent U.S. threats concerning Greenland. In response, Kubilius called for the informal E5 format to be formalised and upgraded into a European Security Council (ESC), consisting of several permanent members supplemented by rotating seats, to enable faster and more decisive action on European security.
He is not alone in advocating this approach. Sergey Lagodinsky, a German Member of the European Parliament, has proposed an ESC composed of the leaders of Europe’s “big six” (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the UK), alongside two rotating seats for smaller states and the President of the European Parliament. Under this proposal, the ESC would be established through a new intergovernmental treaty compatible with EU law, while circumventing the unanimity requirement for defence decisions and allowing non-EU members such as the UK to participate. Public opinion appears receptive: a Politico poll conducted in Germany found that 69% of respondents would prefer their country to be defended by a European army, compared with 13% favouring national forces and 12% NATO forces. Even in Poland were citizens are more skeptical of European defense, repondents preferred a European solution (37%) over NATO (27%) or a national response (24%).
Despite this support, significant obstacles remain. The idea of a European Security Council is not new, it was first floated in the 1980s and has been rejected several times since, notably in 2003 following EU divisions over the Iraq War and again in 2017 after being proposed by then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and French President Emmanuel Macron. Critics argue that deep geographical and political differences among Member States could reduce the ESC to a mere “talking shop,” while mid-sized countries without permanent seats may see such a body as an unacceptable constraint on national sovereignty in defence matters.
Nevertheless, if Europe is serious about countering the Russian threat and developing an independent defence capability, the creation of an ESC, will be unavoidable. Europe must be able to respond quickly, coherently, and effectively to evolving security challenges.
Sources
European Commission, European Commission, Just Security, Politico, Politico,
