No-claims-clause in Russia sanctions is EU public policy

March 1, 2026

CC BY-SA 3.0 © Photo by Ssolbergj (The emblem of the Court of Justice of the European Union.)

On 26 February 2026, Advocate General Andrea Biondi delivered his Opinion in Case C-802/24 (Reibel) on whether EU Russia sanctions can block or later unwind commercial arbitration outcomes inside the EU.

The case stems from a 2015 supply contract between a Belgian seller and a Russian buyer who paid an advance. Belgian authorities later refused an export license because of EU restrictive measures, the goods were never supplied, and the advance was not refunded. The dispute went to arbitration in Sweden. In 2021, a tribunal ordered repayment of the advance plus interest. The Belgian company then sought to have the award set aside, prompting a question to the CJEU as to how Article 11(1) of Regulation 833/2014, the no-claims clause, should operate in this context.

The published request shows three pressure points. First, whether parties are barred from reaching out-of-court settlements on claims that Article 11(1) says are not to be satisfied. Second, whether a national court hearing a set-aside action must assess of its own motion whether the tribunal’s application of law was compatible with Regulation 833/2014, and annul the award if not. Third, whether Article 11(1) nevertheless allows repayment of an advance where non-performance results from sanctions compliance. The Official Journal notice2 frames this as a test of arbitrability, judicial review intensity, and the practical reach of the “no-claims” clause beyond classic damages claims.

The AG’s core move is to separate access to arbitration from the permissibility of satisfying a sanctioned claim. In his view, EU law does not prohibit submitting such disputes to arbitration, but an arbitral tribunal should not give a favorable response to a claim that Article 11(1) bars from being satisfied.

What it means

Crucially, he treats the Article 11(1) prohibition as part of EU public policy. National courts must ensure, may on their own initiative, that an award complies with it and, where appropriate, set the award aside under national rules on order public review.

The signal is institutional. This Opinion would harden sanctions compliance into a mandatory control point for Member State courts supervising arbitration seated in the EU, shifting the practical center of gravity toward ex officio review at the enforcement/set-aside stage. That sits with the Commission’s own guidance in its sanctions FAQs, which presents Article 11 as shielding EU operators from having to satisfy compensation-type claims linked to sanctions-driven non-performance, exactly the factual configuration here.

If the Court follows the Opinion, the likely effect is not a blanket anti-arbitration stance, but a clearer message that arbitration can proceed yet cannot be used to neutralize the operational bite of EU sanctions, with domestic courts positioned as the enforcement backstop.

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