Why did Lajčák fail?
Since the unilateral declaration of the independence of Kosovo in 2008, EU institutions have had to address important diplomatic issues in the Western Balkans. Perhaps the most difficult of these issues has been the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, initiated in March 2011, and “facilitated” by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the appointed Special Representative. Initially focused on resolving technical issues, and never conceived as a tool to directly address the issue of Kosovo’s final status, the dialogue progressively became more political and, consequently, more complex. In its first ten years, the process saw significant commitment from both the European Union and Belgrade and Pristina, leading to the signing of the Brussels Agreement (2013) and the Ohrid Annex (2023). However, these agreements have been only partially implemented, due in part to shifting political dynamics in both parties and a gradual decline in the European Union’s commitment. The latter, not being a monolithic entity, lacks a common foreign policy. The specific interests of member states come into conflict with the EU’s aspiration to establish itself as a major actor on the global stage, affecting its authority as “facilitator” of the dialogue. Indeed, considering that five EU member states (Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece, and Cyprus) do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, it is understandable how difficult it is to maintain the role of a neutral actor. This context helps explain why Miroslav Lajčák, the former Special Representative for the Western Balkans (EUSR), eventually failed to secure a “comprehensive legally-binding normalisation agreement between Kosovo and Serbia”.
Originally from Slovakia, Lajčák was considered by many analysts as the least suitable choice, with critics pointing to his tenure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His political conflict with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, marked by “grave misjudgments and limited political skills”, ultimately earned him a reputation for being “weak on Dodik and pro-Serb”. Lajčák was also accused by several Members of the European Parliament of bias against Kosovo and of contributing to an EU communication strategy that portrayed Kosovo as the aggressor while adopting a milder tone toward Serbia’s non-compliance with agreements, thereby undermining the EU’s credibility. However, the factors hindering progress in the dialogue cannot be attributed solely to the EUSR, as both Serbia and Kosovo have increasingly adopted polarizing and uncooperative rhetoric in recent years. In any case, the asymmetric approach adopted by the EU through Lajčák has made the entire dialogue particularly difficult to sustain. According to analysts Agon Maliqi and Andi Hoxhaj, Lajčák’s unbalanced approach contributed significantly to the stagnation of the dialogue, as many of his positions were perceived as favorable to Serbia.
While Belgrade faced no consequences for failing to implement the Brussels and Ohrid agreements, namely its continued obstruction of Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, Pristina was repeatedly reprimanded and sanctioned for its non-compliance. This double standard fits within the paradigm of stabilitocracy: semi-authoritarian regimes in the Western Balkans that receive implicit or direct support, especially from some EU member states, in the name of (presumed) stability. In this context, Serbia is a paradigmatic case: a political system characterized by clear democratic deficits that nevertheless enjoys legitimacy from the EU as a hegemonic regional actor, capable of shaping political-security dynamics in the Balkans. The EU’s inclination to favor stabilitocracy in the Western Balkans became particularly evident during Lajčák’s mandate, especially in the asymmetric handling of obligations arising from the dialogue. This approach effectively legitimized the Serbian regime, prioritizing the appearance of stability at all costs. Geopolitically, it opened the door for external actors like Russia and China to gain influence in the region as the EU’s credibility eroded, allowing these powers to increasingly project their interests, particularly in Serbia.
One Republika Srpska is enough, the A/CSM: A necessity or a tactic to block the dialogue?
The tendencies that undermined the impartiality of the EU mediator became particularly evident during Lajčák’s mandate, especially in the pressure placed on Pristina to implement provisions of the Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid Annex concerning the establishment of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities in northern Kosovo. The insistence on this point pushed the mediator to propose a draft for the Association, without it being conceived or negotiated by the two parties. The EU then requested that the draft be submitted to Kosovo’s Constitutional Court as a necessary step for continuing the dialogue process. A criticism raised by the European Stability Initiative describes the draft as an external imposition that serves neither the interests of Pristina nor those of the Serb community it targets. The government of Kosovo refused to submit the draft to the Constitutional Court, making its submission conditional on guarantees of de-facto recognition of Kosovo’s status and arguing that the draft violates the multi-ethnic spirit of the Constitution. Since then, the initiative has stalled, as Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti, fearing the creation of a structure resembling Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has clashed with both Belgrade and Brussels over the composition and possible executive powers of the Association. The perception is that the EU’s strategy was aimed at securing Serbia’s consent as a prerequisite for initiating discussions on recognition and normalization. However, it remains unrealistic to expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s independence soon, especially in exchange for limited concessions from Pristina. 
Sovereignty first and double standards
While Lajčák’s approach played a key role in contributing to the dialogue’s stalemate, an additional obstacle was Prime Minister Kurti’s insistence on advancing a series of sovereigntist policies aimed at consolidating Pristina’s central control over northern Kosovo. In this area, where the Serb community forms the majority, and where, for years, the territory was only formally part of Kosovo with the implicit acceptance of the international community, so-called “parallel institutions” operated: structures directed and financed by Belgrade that carried out public administration functions, providing health, education, postal, welfare services, while shielding criminal organizations linked to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. Starting in 2021, Kurti’s government initiated a series of so-called “unilateral actions”, measures that, while legally foreseen, should have followed the sequencing outlined in the Brussels Agreements. These actions aimed to dismantle the parallel structures and integrate them into Kosovo’s central institutions. However, the government’s assertiveness was interpreted by the European Union as a destabilizing factor in the dialogue and normalization process, especially as the Serb community responded with strong protests, riots, and clashes with Kosovo police and NATO’s peace-keeping troops, KFOR. International criticism was followed by punitive measures from the EU against the government of Kosovo, with their lifting made conditional on de-escalation in northern Kosovo. Two years later, these measures remain in effect, structurally impacting the Kosovo economy.
The European Union’s response, however, was not mirrored in its approach to the Serbian government. A notable example is Belgrade’s direct involvement in protecting Milan Radoičić, the Kosovo-Serb militant who orchestrated a terrorist attack on the Banjska monastery in northern Kosovo in September 2023. This attack, carried out by two nebulous armed groups coordinated by Radoičić, resulted in the death of a Kosovar policeman and a violation of Kosovo’s territorial integrity. Radoičić, former vice-president of Srpska Lista, the party representing the Serb community in Kosovo’s parliament, is known for his close ties to Serbian President Vučić’s party. Although Radoičić is currently wanted by Interpol, the EU has not imposed any punitive measures on Serbia to pressure his extradition.
Another example of leniency toward Serbia is President Vučić’s recent visit to the military parade in Moscow on 9 May, commemorating the Victory Day. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, had warned candidate countries against attending the event, making it clear she did not want any to participate. Yet, Vučić was welcomed with full honors. Shortly after, the President of the European Council, António Costa, visited Belgrade, praising Serbia’s commitment to EU accession and downplaying the Moscow visit as “an opportunity to commemorate a historical event”.
This sequence highlights the need for a structural change, or at least an explicit acknowledgment, in the EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans, where ‘realpolitik’ currently takes primacy over the goal of promoting and securing liberal democracies in the region.
EUSR Sørensen: A new approach and what to expect
Ambiguity has become a defining feature of today’s international politics, with relations between major powers increasingly unpredictable. While the European Union continues to focus on repairing its alliance with the United States, a partnership that has long served as the foundation of European security, it can no longer assume that U.S. security guarantees are unconditional or enduring. In this shifting geopolitical landscape, it should be clear to the EU that the stability of its immediate neighborhood, the Western Balkans, must be defended for security reasons. As such, defending democracy in the region must be an absolute strategic priority. Focusing all efforts against Russia on the Ukrainian front while neglecting the Western Balkans leaves a crucial flank exposed. In chess terms, it is like opening a game by immediately charging in with your queen, neglecting your other pieces and leaving your defenses open. Such an impulsive move exposes you to lethal countermoves. A wise foreign policy, like a good chess opening, requires balance: first consolidating positions, then launching an attack. Otherwise, the risk is a defeat at home.
Having said that, in January 2025, Lajčák was succeeded by Peter Sørensen. With more than seven years of experience in Kosovo and the Western Balkans, providing him with deep insight into the region’s complex historical, political, and social dynamics, the EU appears to have initiated a change of course in the facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Another sign of the shift in direction is the specificity of the mandate: whereas Lajčák represented the EU across the entire Western Balkans, the newly appointed EUSR focuses exclusively on facilitating dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, with an almost doubled annual budget dedicated solely to this goal. Additionally, Sørensen is from Denmark, a country that recognizes Kosovo’s independence.
What remains to be seen is whether the tone, structure, and objectives of the dialogue will also change. While normalization remains the ultimate goal, it is unclear if the EU will continue with the current approach or adopt a different strategy, perhaps involving civil society from both countries more substantially and from the bottom up. According to Peter Sørensen’s initial remarks, given the current stagnation and the internal political situations on both sides, there is little prospect for a comprehensive and final solution. It is more likely that contentious issues like the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities or the dispute over the closure of parallel structures will be set aside for now. Instead, efforts may focus on areas with greater potential for constructive dialogue, such as the issue of Missing Persons. Resolving this would be significant.Not only would families of war victims finally receive the remains of their loved ones, but it would also help ease tensions between the parties. Although challenging, this approach aligns more closely with the ultimate goal of normalizing relations.
Conclusions
What now seems clear, regardless of how the normalization process between Belgrade and Pristina unfolds, is that realpolitik considerations continue to dominate the EU’s approach. However, Brussels must urgently recognize that diplomatic success here is not merely symbolic, it is crucial for the EU’s security in its historically vulnerable underbelly: the Western Balkans. The appointment of Sørensen is certainly a wiser, more tactically sound move. Yet, the real challenge lies not in tactics but in the overarching strategy. Since 1999, the EU has invested too much effort in Kosovo’s state-building, and its need for a diplomatic success on the geopolitical chessboard is too great to allow interference from Russia and China in its own backyard. Crucially, the five EU member states that have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence must be pressured to do so, and mediation must be conducted between equals, because only then can compromises truly be made, and only then can mediators truly be impartial.
