Introduction
Hungary’s transformation under the 15-year rule of Viktor Orbán has emerged as a central battleground in European debates over democratic erosion and the loss of the rule of law. The systematic demolishing of media independence, judicial oversight, and civil society in Hungary has not only challenged the EU’s foundational principles but established an easily followable, low-risk template for right-wing movements across the continent. As similar parties gain considerable support in Italy and Germany, their adoption of Hungarian-style frameworks has provoked divergent responses across European capitals. This article examines how these reactions reveal deeper fault lines in European political geography, particularly through the lens of media coverage, political discourse, and institutional responses in Germany and Italy. The cross-border spread of Orbán’s authoritarian practices ultimately exposes critical weaknesses in the European consensus on democratic governance and rule of law, undermining the EU’s capacity to counter growing internal threats to its democratic foundations.
Hungary’s Democratic Backsliding: Context and Mechanisms
The Orbán model
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has overseen Hungary’s democratic decline since 2010, characterised by what scholars’ term “democratic backsliding” – the erosion of institutional checks and balances, power concentration, and the systematic weakening of independent oversight mechanisms. This transformation has followed a distinctive pattern with three core elements:
- Media Control: Fidesz has systematically transformed Hungary’s media through market manipulations rather than direct censorship, applying regulatory pressure, economic incentives, and widespread strategic state advertising to create a pro-government media ecosystem. The remaining independent media face financial strangulation while pro-government media receive substantial state support.
- Judicial Reforms: Extensive constitutional and administrative reforms have centralised judicial governance under direct political control, with government appointees now overseeing court administration and judicial promotions, undermining the independence of the judiciary.
- Civil Society Restrictions: Organisations critical of government policies encounter legal obstacles and financial limitations, with foreign-funded NGOs particularly being targeted.
European and International Responses
The European Union has responded to these oppressive measures with a mix of rhetorical condemnation, legal proceedings, and more recently, financial sanctions. However, these targeted measures have often been slow, fragmented, and limited in their effectiveness, due in part to the need for consensus among EU member states and the political influence of backsliding governments within EU institutions. They inevitably comfort Fidesz supporters by assisting to the government’s narrative in which the EU is projected as an oppressive empire which endangers Hungary’s sovereignty.
Spread of the Orbán Toolkit: Italy and Germany in Focus
The Rise of Right-Wing Parties
The past years have seen a wave of right-wing populist parties across Europe. In Italy, parties such as Lega and Fratelli d’Italia have risen to power, while in Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has become a significant force in national and regional politics. These parties often share Orbán’s scepticism towards liberal democratic norms, the EU, and immigration. 
Policy Convergence
Elements of the “Hungarian style” are increasingly visible in the initiatives and, in some cases, even the practices of Italian and German right-wing parties:
- Media Narratives: Both Italian and German right-wing parties have echoed Orbán’s rhetoric about “biased” mainstream media and have called for reforms to ensure “pluralism” and the proper representation of “national values” against alleged left-liberal bias. For instance, the AfD regularly denounces German public broadcasters as “state media,” while Lega leaders have called for media reforms to counter what they term “Brussels propaganda”.
- Judicial Critique: There are growing calls to “reform” judicial institutions framed as obstacles to national sovereignty or as “politicised” by left-liberal elites. Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia has proposed reforms to limit judicial power over government decisions, while the AfD has criticized German courts for being “activist” when ruling against conservative policies. Both parties echo Orbán’s framing of an independent judiciary as a threat to democratic will.
- Rule of Law Discourses: The invocation of national sovereignty and the critique of “Brussels interference” have become common, alarmingly mirroring Orbán’s framing of EU criticism as attacks on national self-determination.
Comparative Perceptions Across European Capitals
From the political discourse in Rome to the media coverage in Berlin and the authoritarian practices in Budapest, Fidesz’s agenda creates distinct but unmistakable echoes across European capitals, shaped by each nation’s geographic proximity, historical experience, and domestic political contexts.
Germany
Media Coverage
German media have generally been critical of Hungary’s democratic decline, often framing Orbán as an outlier and warning of the dangers of emulating his approach.Major outlets including Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, and Süddeutsche Zeitung have published extensive investigative reporting and editorial commentary frequently highlight the risks of media capture and judicial politicisation, drawing direct parallels to developments in Hungary.
Political Discourse
Mainstream German parties, particularly the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, have condemned democratic backsliding in Hungary and currently call for more effective measures against Hungary within the EU. The AfD, however, has praised aspects of Orbán’s governance, particularly his stance on migration and national sovereignty. This development has led to polarised debates within Germany about the appropriate balance between EU intervention and respect for national autonomy.
Institutional Reactions
Germany has played a key role in pushing for EU-level responses to backsliding, although internal divisions and the need for consensus have often blunted the impact of these efforts. Notably, Germany’s position is shaped by its own historical experience with authoritarianism and its self-conception as a guardian of liberal democracy in Europe.
Italy
Media Coverage
Italian media responses to Hungary’s trajectory have been more ambivalent. While liberal outlets express concern about democratic erosion, right-leaning and populist platforms often portray Orbán as a defender of “real” European values against technocratic elites in Brussels, which perfectly mirrors the narrative of Fidesz. Coverage tends to be more fragmented, reflecting Italy’s polarised media landscape.
Political Discourse
Italy’s right-wing parties have openly admired and, in some cases, sought to emulate Orbán’s approach. Matteo Salvini (Lega) and Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d’Italia) have both praised Hungary’s migration policies and its resistance to EU “interference.” Salvini has explicitly called Orbán “a model for Europe,” while Meloni has adopted similar rhetoric about protecting traditional values against EU overreach. However, there is less consensus within Italian politics about the desirability of wholesale institutional change, given Italy’s own complex history with authoritarianism and its entrenched political pluralism.
Institutional Reactions
Italy’s institutional response has been cautious. While successive governments have participated in EU-level debates on the rule of law, they have often prioritized national interests and coalition stability over principled opposition to backsliding. This approach reflects Italy’s tradition of pragmatic, sometimes transactional, engagement with EU norms.
Geographic and Cultural Proximity: Shaping National Responses
These divergent responses reflect deeper patterns of political geography and historical experience that shape how different European nations perceive threats to democratic governance.
The Role of Political Geography
Geographic and cultural proximity to Hungary plays a significant role in shaping perceptions and responses. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, sharing post-communist legacies and concerns about sovereignty, are often more sympathetic to Hungary’s position or reluctant to support punitive measures. However, states with longer liberal democratic traditions in Western Europe, such as Germany, tend to be more alarmed by democratic backsliding and more supportive of robust EU intervention.
The Influence of Domestic Political Contexts
National responses are also shaped by domestic political dynamics. Germany’s experience with totalitarianism informs a strong normative commitment to democracy and the rule of law, making it more sensitive to any signs of democratic backsliding. In contrast, Italy’s fragmented party system and history of coalition governments encourage a more pragmatic, less ideologically driven approach to EU norms. Additionally, the structure and ownership of national media influence public perceptions, with more pluralistic systems better able to resist government attempts at narrative control.
The “Hungarian Style” in Practice: Institutional Resistance and Adaptation
Media Control
Hungary’s approach to media control relies on indirect, but systemic methods such as regulatory capture, market manipulation, and the strategic use of state advertising to reward loyal outlets while brutally punishing critics. Although Italian and German right-wing parties have adopted similar rhetoric, the institutional and legal frameworks in these countries have so far prevented comparable levels of media capture. In Italy, the media landscape is highly politicised with longstanding ties between the media owners and political elites yet attempts to centralise control and/or silence dissent have faced resistance from civil society and the judiciary. In Germany, strong constitutional protections and a tradition of public service broadcasting have largely insulated the media from overt political control, despite repeated attacks by the AfD accusing public broadcasters of bias.
Judicial Independence
The last 15 years of Hungarian judicial reforms have reached their goal of centralised power over appointments and administration in the hands of political appointees, severely undermining judicial independence. In contrast, similar reforms proposed by right-wing parties in Italy and Germany have encountered strong institutional and public resistance. Italy’s judiciary has historically played a key role in checking executive power, with attempts to politicise judicial appointments provoking public outcry and legal challenges. Meanwhile, in Germany, judicial independence is a fundamental constitutional principle, and any efforts to weaken it would likely prompt a robust response from both the courts and civil society.
The Rule of Law
The rule of law is a foundational value of the EU, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Hungary’s backsliding has exposed the limitations of EU mechanisms for enforcing compliance, particularly when member states invoke national sovereignty and build alliances to block sanctions.The EU’s Article 7 procedures and Rule of Law Mechanism have proven insufficient to halt democratic erosion, and have revealed the urgent need for more robust enforcement mechanisms that can operate without requiring unanimity among member states.
Fractures in the European Consensus
The diffusion of Orbán’s “toolkit” across Europe has revealed deep fractures in the EU’s normative consensus:
- Fragmented Responses: The EU’s approach to democratic backsliding is fragmented, with different institutions and member states pursuing divergent strategies.
- Competing Priorities: National interests, political alliances, and concerns about sovereignty often trump principled opposition to backsliding.
- Erosion of Trust: The inability to coordinate effective responses undermines mutual trust among member states and threatens the integrity of the whole European project.
Conclusion: The Future of Democracy and the EU
The spread of “Hungarian style” governance across Europe is both a symptom and a cause of the EU’s current crisis of democracy. As right-wing parties in Italy, Germany, and beyond adopt elements of Orbán’s approach, the EU’s capacity to defend its foundational values – human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and respect for human rights – remains to be increasingly in question.
The varied responses across European capitals reflect even deeper but not-well-recognised patterns of political geography, historical memory, and institutional resilience.Germany’s strong opposition reflects its post-war commitment to liberal democracy, while Italy’s more ambivalent stance demonstrates how domestic political calculations can easily override normative commitments.
Ultimately, the challenge for the EU is not only to confront democratic backsliding in individual member states but also to rebuild a shared commitment to the rule of law and democratic norms that can withstand the pressures of populism and polarisation. This requires both ultimate institutional reforms to strengthen enforcement mechanisms and a renewed effort to efficiently articulate why liberal democratic values remain essential for Europe’s future prosperity and stability.
