EU foreign policy is adamant about deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine, and with good reason. However, if it does not take the time to consider what a post-Putin Russia may look like, it will find itself on the back foot in reaction to what is to come in Putin’s stead. This brief looks at two plausible scenarios and sketches out suitable modes of reaction, respectively.
Life is Like a Box of Chocolates…
« Il y aura un après-Poutine. C’est inévitable. Peut-être demain, peut-être dans quelques années. Notre tâche est d’être prêts pour ce jour. » — Mikhaïl Khodorkovski
Since the 20th century, Western Europe has had a particularly difficult relationship with Russia. The Cold War had split the continent right down the middle into Western and Soviet spheres of influence. After the dissolution of the USSR, a brief moment of hope was squandered by Western hubris and Russian insecurity, leading us into the current deadlock tragically symbolised by the savagery of the Ukraine war.
What we mustn’t forget, however, is that none of what is unravelling on our screens and newspapers is the product of an inevitability. Europe and Russia aren’t inherently bound to go to war. Brussels, caught up in putting out the many short-term fires of the ongoing crises, therefore risks losing its imagination. Indeed, the current attitude in Europe wrongly tends to see Russia as a nation doomed to be ruled in a violent and autocratic manner. If we cannot imagine Russia and Putin as separate entities, we will be unable to react with sufficient speed when the latter inevitably falls. Failing to anticipate this moment risks locking Europe into reactive, short‑term thinking, which is detrimental to good strategy. In a humble attempt at foresight, this policy paper sifts through the 20th century for two moments where despotic Russian leaders, seemingly eternal in their rule, suddenly met their demise. This exercise seeks to build an intellectual foundation for a future where Russia peacefully coexists with Europe and the other Great Powers. 
First in line is Tsar Nicholas II, the incompetent monarch who lost the faith of his people and consequently faced their wrath. Seeing the comparison with Putin, this brief recommends that Europe adopts a proactive attitude in the face of large-scale public protests by seeking to empower Russian civil society and conditionally normalise economic relations.
A more probable future, however, may be similar to the sudden death of Stalin, who was unexpectedly replaced by a tone-changing Khrushchev. In such a case, where Putin is replaced by a secretly plotting loyalist, Europe must take diplomatic initiative and approach Russia’s new leader with a clean slate.
Political transitions in authoritarian systems tend to be sudden, opaque, and highly consequential. Russia is no exception. Whether Putin exits through crisis, elite succession, or gradual withdrawal, the EU must have a plan for dealing with his successor. This is a delicate matter. Europe cannot control Russia’s future, but it can shape the conditions under which it responds. This requires developing a forward-looking playbook, however eternal Putin’s reign may seem.
Nicholas
When flipping through the catalogue of moments of regime change in Russian history, the demise of Tsar Nicholas II is arguably the most striking one. The events leading up to 1917’s revolutionary moments teach us how military overreach and loss of legitimacy can rapidly erode an autocratic system.
In this light, it doesn’t take a PhD in Slavic studies to see some likeness between Putin and his unfortunate royal predecessor. Indeed, both of them are repressive and have tied their fate to their success in a war they cannot win. Granted, Putin is more courageous and capable than Nicholas II. The latter was famously uncharismatic and jittery. During WWI, he couldn’t even give a proper speech in front of his soldiers. It was this mix of a lack of charisma paired with weak results in the war effort that depleted the Russian army’s faith in the monarchy, eventually leading to its overthrow and the assassination of the tsar and his family.
Similar to Nicholas II, however, Putin is indeed in over his head when it comes to his broader fight against “the decadent West”. Even if the end of the Ukraine war allows him to keep his most recent conquests -the likely outcome if current American and Russian diplomacy prevail-, it will hardly be the grand victory he is trying to sell at home. NATO has only grown in membership, and Europe is re-arming after decades of decreasing military spending. Coupled with serious blows dealt to Russia’s economy through waves of sanctions, as well as increased dependency on China, he might have a hard time keeping up his image as the omnipotent patriarchal statesman. If Putin breaks character while demanding even more sacrifices from his country, he may have to pay a similar price as Nicholas II did.
Legal, Yet Formative
If such a demoralisation can influence the behaviour of the Russian people, public protests may be able to re-emerge and swell in ranks rapidly -especially if the police and military join in as in 1917. If such a popular momentum can force Putin to abdicate, Europe should find a way to empower the exiled Russian opposition through legal means. As these actors ought to be Europe’s future partners, we should equip them with governance training by enhancing their communication and organisational skills. If timed correctly, the protected re-entry of these actors into Russia could be instrumental in aiding a bottom-up democratisation process that is sensitive to Russian culture and norms.
Coupled with a conditional roadmap for removing sanctions, Europe should gradually normalise economic relations with Russia when it starts to meet predesigned and realistic criteria. If the war in Ukraine rages on, a ceasefire implementation should be the top priority. However, if by this time the war has been settled on a maximalist Russian basis -eastern Ukraine annexed-, talks of restoring full sovereignty to Ukraine should be secondary to the establishment of publicly accountable institutions in Russia. Europe must also prepare to manage the possible excesses of the ensuing instability. Through cooperation with Eastern Partnership states, NATO and the OSCE, it ought to prepare action plans regarding border security, refugee planning, and nuclear-risk protocols.
Again, it is not up to Europe to decide Russia’s future; only the Russian people may do that. Nevertheless, it ought to responsibly support the establishment of a bottom-up democratic movement in Russia where it can. Europe should avoid triumphalism and short-sighted reformism, the principal mistake of the Shock Doctrine of the 1990s. Instead, it should responsibly seek stable and long-term engagement with this chaotic but potential-filled Russia.
Nikita
Putin’s fall will not necessarily be paired with a social revolution, however. When Stalin died in 1953, he was eventually replaced by Nikita Khrushchev, an old Bolshevik who had survived the purges due to his unquestioned loyalty to Stalin. Khrushchev’s rise was far from evident. It was Georgi Malenkov, Stalin’s deputy up until his death, who was seen as the apparent successor. Nevertheless, Khrushchev rose to power by outmanoeuvring the weak Malenkov through the establishment of the “five-man Secretariat” -in the announcements of which Khrushchev’s name always seemed to be listed first, while the other four members were listed alphabetically. Despite his life-saving loyalty, however, Khrushchev’s legacy came to be one of de-Stalinisation. In his ‘Secret Speech’ in 1956, Khrushchev famously provided a devastating critique of Stalin, sending shockwaves through the communist world. Abroad, Khrushchev offered “peaceful coexistence” with the West, reversing the Stalinist policy of permanent war against the capitalist world.
Despite the many contradictions of Khrushchev’s foreign policy, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis, it did demonstrate something important: even within a regime as murderous and paranoid as that of Stalin, there may be relatively unknown potential successors capable of ushering in a change of tone. Applied to contemporary Russia, this means that Putin’s successor may be one of his high-ranking loyalists plotting a radically different future for the country’s foreign affairs.
Open for Dialogue
If a figure like Khrushchev were to re-emerge, Europe should move quickly by approaching them with a clean slate, leaving the Russia hawks in Brussels at home. If this leader seems to enjoy a stable base of legitimacy, Europe should avoid labelling them as ‘just another Putin’ as long as they do not demonstrate similar behaviour. Instead, Europe should proactively demonstrate that it is willing to engage with this new Russia and seek peaceful coexistence with it. Europe should thus avoid its tendency of condescension, however revolting one may find certain practices of the Russians.
Russian high politics enjoys notions of national grandeur. A European diplomatic attitude towards Russia should appease such notions in its communication, while avoiding conceding any real power. Reopening talks on arms control treaties like START, while publicly articulating a phased sanctions-relief framework which empowers Russian moderates, could lead us into a new détente which would be beneficial for both parties. More discreetly, Europe could highlight that Russia has lost the most ground to China rather than to Europe, and that it could balance this situation by economically cooperating with Europe more meaningfully.
Conclusion
Speculating about the future is always risky. Even the brightest minds in foreign affairs have been proven disastrously wrong by that force which is often dramatically referred to as ‘fortune’. Stalin, whose strategic agility had helped him miraculously come out on top after WWII, had nevertheless been taken aback by Hitler’s 1941 invasion. Having read Clausewitz, with the knowledge that Hitler had done so too, Stalin had made an educated guess that his German counterpart would not fight a war on two fronts. He was, simply yet brutally, wrong. One may claim that this policy brief contains many such educated guesses. This, however, does not mean we ought not to ask ourselves questions about the longer term of EU-Russia relations. A good strategy is comprehensive and should allow one to react quickly to even the most unexpected of blows. It must therefore contain such educated guesses. Furthermore, I would argue that this brief is founded upon perhaps that sole certainty in life promised to us all: death. One day, in one way or another, be it by execution like Nicholas II, a lonely stroke like Stalin, or a peaceful passing like Gorbachev, Putin and his regime will come to an end. We must give shape to whatever is to come in its stead without losing sight of our own values.
