Climate policy remains a crucial topic in European policymaking, but it is also widely debated, as enthusiasm for climate action has been fading. On one side, there are mainstream, pro-climate and pro-EU parties, both in the European Parliament (EP) and in national parliaments, which generally support it and argue it is needed for achieving climate neutrality in the EU and combating climate change. On the other side, their opponents, including many far-right parties, are generally against climate policies and argue that they threaten citizens’ living standards and national economies. The electoral performance of these parties, including in the 2024 European Parliament elections, has intensified the political debate over the costs and benefits of climate action. Therefore, the key question for pro-climate actors is how to address these economic concerns without abandoning their climate objectives.
A possible strategy is for mainstream parties and institutions to learn from the opposition’s success and focus mainly on climate policies’ economic benefits, both for member states and at the European level more generally, in their discourse. Such a shift in messaging could help counter claims that climate action runs against citizens’ interests, although its effect on decreasing far-right support may vary. Because the approach entails changing how existing policies are communicated, it can be adopted quickly, by any actor, and with no additional costs or new policy instruments. This article analyses the rationale for this strategy and how it can be implemented.
The EU’s climate policy
Since the 1990s, climate change has become an increasingly prominent issue in EU policymaking. Specifically, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 helped advance international climate cooperation and provided an important context for the development of EU climate objectives and policies. The EU subsequently established itself as an influential actor in international climate policy, drawing on its economic and political leverage as well as its efforts to lead by example. Its international role in climate policy has also helped coordinate EU climate action and formulate a common European position, strengthening the EU’s unity and credibility in global climate negotiations.
Its flagship climate policy plan, the European Green Deal (EGD), was signed in 2019 and has the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. It is the most intense and encompassing climate policy initiative and has expanded into various policy domains with little connection to environmental protection before its introduction. Moreover, the European Commission must regularly review all future EU policies, as well as existing ones, to see whether they are consistent with the Union’s objective for climate neutrality.
Currently, the EU has developed five types of climate policies, called “patterns of governance action”. The first is setting emission-cutting targets, which is done through political bargaining in the European Council. The second is the Commission proposing complex and large policy packages as a method to advance its policy, including in the climate domain. Third, an integrated approach to climate action has developed across multiple policy domains, such as forestry, social issues, energy policy, etc. Fourth, climate policies aiming to make industries more sustainable (like increasing energy efficiency or expanding renewable energy) have shifted in their scope, political approach, and level of implementation. Finally, following the EGD, adaptation measures started being implemented together with climate mitigation ones. Nonetheless, the EU’s efforts to help the environment and implement green initiatives, as well as its leadership in the climate sector, face growing political opposition within.
Far-right opposition
Recently, anti-establishment parties, including many far-right ones, have been increasingly mobilising voters around divisive issues (also called “wedge issues”), which cut across established political alignments and expose disagreements within or between parties. Mobilising a wedge issue divides people on the topic and undermines support for parties with mainstream stances on it, thus attracting some voters towards parties who challenge conventional views. Climate action is today one such point of contention, and many voters dissatisfied with mainstream parties have become supporters of challenger parties opposed to many climate policies. This strategy has been working so far, as in national elections in 2022, 32% of European voters cast their ballots for anti-establishment parties, compared with 20% in the early 2000s and 12% in the early 1990s, with most votes going to far-right parties. Where far-right parties entered government, many times their actions conflicted with EU climate objectives.
The far-right’s success in opposing climate action comes from growing anti-climate beliefs in the population. This is because, in the past, climate policies did not directly impact the livelihoods of people, thus granting them much support from voters. As the EU’s green ambitions became greater, people and businesses started being affected (e.g., through tighter regulations). Thus, especially with the help of far-right challenger parties, people started associating climate policy with economic hardships and lost the enthusiasm for helping the environment at the cost of their national industries. As climate policy is a centrepiece of EU policymaking, growing dissatisfaction with it led to growing dissatisfaction with the EU in general and vice versa: EU scepticism caused by other issues led to growing dissatisfaction with climate policy. This amplified other wedge issues far-right parties have been mobilising voters against, such as migration and European integration. Overall, a reinforcing dynamic has formed between EU scepticism and climate scepticism, which is fuelled by voters’ association of climate policy with economic concerns.
Emphasising national benefits of climate policy
Strengthening public support for climate action is necessary for countering this reinforcing political dynamic. One possible approach is emphasising how climate policies benefit national economies, rather than focusing on their contributions to the climate as a whole or to European integration. Green policies supporting disadvantaged regions and workers (i.e. those groups with the biggest economic hardships) are generally more supported by voters than those without such benefits. When climate policies are targeted towards improving national industries and the economic condition of disadvantaged groups in the country, the perceived trade-off between economic growth and climate action disappears. Moreover, voter surveys show investments in green industries at the national level are preferred to those at the EU level, and even those at the EU level are popular when their goal of reducing dependencies and inequalities between member states is emphasised. Pro-climate actors should highlight the positive effects of existing and future policies on such regions and workers, on bringing investments to national economies, and on reducing European dependencies and inequalities
Far-right parties generally frame climate policy as a threat to national economic interests and sovereignty, arguing that EU elites and institutions do not adequately consider national circumstances when imposing costly measures. In contrast, in discussing this policy domain, mainstream pro-climate parties tend to emphasise European coordination and integration rather than the possible benefits individual countries can receive. Their current framing fuels economic concerns rather than diminishing them. The efficiency of reducing opposition, however, depends on the political context and on whether the promised benefits are credible and visible to voters.
Reframing climate policy should highlight both its potential national benefits, such as job creation, industrial development, and support for disadvantaged regions, and its wider European economic benefits, including strategic autonomy and competitiveness. Strategic autonomy, in this context, refers to “reducing the EU’s dependence on others” in critical sectors including raw minerals and clean technologies. In the EU, climate policies are tied to industrial policies, such as through the Critical Raw Materials Act or the Net-Zero Industry Act. Strengthening the Union’s strategic autonomy aims to boost economic sectors and industrial capacity across the EU, overall bringing national economic benefits to its member states. Second, climate policies, especially those tied to supporting green industries, aim to increase the EU’s competitiveness in global markets. By fostering new technologies in this field, they create comparative advantages which can help the Union compete with powers like the USA or China, which have also been investing in environmentally friendly industries. Again, for the EU’s members, achieving the goals of these policies would mean increased industrial capacity and economic growth. Whether such policies are making progress towards achieving their goals is debated, but beyond the purpose of this article.
Reducing external dependencies and bolstering European economic competitiveness are among the main goals of several European policies related to the green transition. Yet pro-climate actors do not make these benefits sufficiently visible to national audiences. Mainstream parties, both national and European, often focus on EU policy coordination and integration, and opposing parties focus on their perceived costs. This creates an opportunity for pro-climate actors, both within European and national institutions, to elaborate how EU-level objectives translate into tangible benefits for national economies and communities.
Why reframing is a feasible strategy
Highlighting climate policies’ national economic benefits is a straightforward strategy because it entails changing how existing policies are communicated and promoted rather than introducing new policy instruments. Thus, its cost of implementation is negligible, and it can be adopted by any pro-European institution, both at the EU and at the national level, relatively quickly. First, this strategy does not imply additional financial incentives for citizens. Existing European initiatives dedicated to raising support for climate policies through public awareness and education campaigns, such as the European Climate Pact, the LIFE Programme, and the Just Transition Platform, do not emphasise national and/or economic benefits. As EU-wide instruments for spreading awareness of the benefits of climate policies and environmental protection already exist, this reframing can make use of them quickly and without any additional costs.
Second, any institution, either at the national or the European level, can implement it immediately and unilaterally without necessarily needing to coordinate with other actors. Both at the EU and at the national levels, initiatives to raise the popularity of climate action require negotiation among relevant actors and bureaucratic processes to be approved, delaying their implementation and possibly altering their original scope. Since this strategy requires no additional costs and is decentralised, it can bypass all these processes and be adopted immediately by any institution. Moreover, it is very flexible. European institutions can focus on EU-wide benefits and general national economic benefits (like creating jobs or improving national industries). National institutions can focus on issues more directly relevant to their constituencies, like household costs, bolstering certain industries, and helping specific disadvantaged industrial regions. For example, the Romanian Jiu Valley is a useful case for explaining how the transition away from carbon-intensive industries can be linked to regional economic development. This flexibility also applies to different political traditions and ideologies. Centre-right parties can emphasise competitiveness, economic growth and market opportunities; centre-left parties can focus on employment, worker protection and regional inequality; and green parties can connect economic benefits with environmental protection and the well-being of future generations. Such differences need not prevent these parties from communicating a shared support for environmental protection.
Conclusion
Climate policy has become a central part of EU policymaking, with the European Green Deal serving as the Union’s flagship framework for the green transition. However, it has also become more politically contested, with far-right and other opposition parties challenging measures they argue impose costs on households, businesses, or national economies. Recently, the support for this opposition has been increasing, signaling to pro-climate actors that they must find new ways to attract support for their goals.
A viable and straightforward way to achieve this is for them to emphasise the national economic benefits of climate action. Instead of focusing almost solely on the benefits it brings for the global climate and European coordination and integration, national and European institutions should combine this narrative with the benefits it brings to competitiveness, industrial capacity, strategic autonomy, energy security, and disadvantaged regions and workers, among others. This strategy has three crucial advantages. First, its cost of implementation is negligible, as it does not imply additional financial incentives to citizens or new policy instruments. Second, any actor can implement it unilaterally and adjust this reframing based on the political context they operate in and their targeted audience. Finally, it can be employed quickly, since it only entails a change in rhetoric.
A good example where this strategy can be implemented is this year’s United Nations Climate Conference (COP31), the largest international summit for advancing global climate cooperation. The EU set its negotiating priorities, specifically transitioning away from fossil fuels faster, making more grants and concessional funds available for climate initiatives, and providing funds for adaptation to new economic settings. In the context of COP31, representatives of the EU and its member states should connect the benefits climate action brings to the environment, as it has been predominantly doing, with the national economic benefits this would bring. By following this strategy, the EU would boost the popularity of climate policy and thus improve its chances of achieving its negotiating priorities.
Overall, the efficiency of this tactic will depend on the audiences of the institutions (whether they are at the national or the European level, their ideology and so on) and may not show visible improvement across the continent until enough pro-climate actors adopt this discourse. However, doing this imposes no additional costs, and any actor implementing this reframing can only gain from it.