For decades, Europe has been shielded by an unspoken assumption: that the United States, through NATO, would provide an unwavering nuclear deterrent against any existential threat. This belief underpinned the continent’s post-war order, allowing European nations to focus on economic and political integration without shouldering the immense burden of nuclear armament. But history does not stand still, and in the volatile climate of the 2020s, a fundamental question is now surfacing: Can Europe continue to rely on American nuclear assurances, or must it begin charting its own course?
“I want to believe that the United States will remain by our side, but we need to be ready if that were not the case.”
French President, Emmanuel Macron in a address to the nation (March. 5th 2025)
A Shifting Paradigm: From Cold War Certainty to Strategic Ambiguity
During the Cold War, Europe’s security architecture was built on the back of a rigid bipolar world order. The United States and the Soviet Union dictated the terms of nuclear engagement, with Europe existing more as a strategic chessboard than an independent player. France and the United Kingdom, each maintaining their own nuclear arsenals, provided an additional layer of deterrence but were ultimately overshadowed by the sheer scale of American and Soviet stockpiles.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nuclear deterrence seemed to fade into the background. Europe embraced disarmament and non-proliferation, assuming that diplomacy and economic interdependence had buried the specter of large-scale war. Even when Russia engaged in localized aggression, as seen in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, NATO’s nuclear posture remained largely unchanged, with European leaders reluctant to reawaken Cold War anxieties. 
But that complacency did not last. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered assumptions about European security. Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats, alongside military exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons, sent shockwaves through NATO capitals. Meanwhile, the growing political unpredictability of the United States raised urgent questions about the reliability of American commitments. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. political scene, with his transactional view of alliances and open skepticism toward NATO, forced European leaders to consider an unsettling possibility: What if the United States, in the moment of ultimate crisis, hesitated or even refused to extend its nuclear shield?
Macron’s Call to Arms: A European Nuclear Doctrine?
French President Emmanuel Macron has not shied away from these hard questions. Over the past five years, he has steadily built a case for greater European nuclear autonomy. His speech in Sweden in early 2025 marked the most direct intervention yet, making clear that France, the EU’s sole nuclear power after Brexit, bears a special responsibility for continental security.
“Everything that covered our territory was decided by the big guys in the room, not by the Europeans themselves”, Macron declared to a hushed audience of military officers. Adding, “Going forward, we have to be the one to decide”.
Though he stopped short of proposing a fully Europeanized nuclear force, the implications were unmistakable. France’s independent deterrent, long defined by its doctrine of “vital national interests,” would now take on a more explicit European dimension. When pressed on whether Paris would use its nuclear weapons to defend Scandinavian countries, Macron responded with a decisive “definitely yes.”
His follow-up speech on March 5, 2025, made this commitment even clearer. In a bold departure from past French doctrine, he announced his intention to open a strategic debate on extending France’s nuclear deterrence to its European allies. While carefully avoiding any suggestion of shared decision-making, he hinted at new forms of coordination, perhaps including European participation in French nuclear exercises or joint planning frameworks.
Skepticism and Divisions: Can France Lead Where the U.S. Might Falter?
Yet, despite Macron’s assertiveness, his nuclear vision faces deep skepticism across Europe. Germany, the economic anchor of the continent, remains cautious. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, while acknowledging the importance of European defense, has urged a “calm and wise approach,” wary of anything that might signal a break with the United States. Historically resistant to nuclear escalation, Berlin is reluctant to embrace an explicitly European deterrent, particularly one centered around France’s strategic prerogatives.
Other countries share Germany’s wariness. Poland, arguably NATO’s most hawkish member, has shown more interest in deepening its nuclear cooperation with the United States than in turning to France. The Baltic states, likewise, see American protection as the ultimate guarantee of their survival, fearing that shifting to a European model could erode Washington’s commitment.
Furthermore, Macron’s push comes at a politically delicate moment. With a a push for more military spending and an increase in its firepower on the horizon, France itself is heading into uncertain domestic terrain, with Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally party gaining ground. Le Pen, historically skeptical of NATO and aligned with nationalist policies, has explicitly stated that France’s nuclear deterrence is for France alone. Should she take power in the next election cycle, Macron’s Europeanized nuclear ambitions could be swiftly reversed.
The American Factor: The Uncertain Future of NATO’s Umbrella
Of course, all of these calculations hinge on what happens in Washington. Trump’s recent remarks, in which he suggested he would “encourage” Russia to attack NATO members who fail to meet spending targets, sent shivers through the alliance. Even if such comments are dismissed as political bluster, they highlight a dangerous reality: American security guarantees are no longer taken for granted.
The nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO, which place U.S. tactical nuclear bombs in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, are under scrutiny. If Washington withdraws, would these nations seek alternative nuclear arrangements? Would Germany, long resistant to nuclear ambitions, consider breaking its postwar taboo? Could a Franco-British nuclear axis emerge as a stabilizing force?
A Future Unwritten: Europe at the Crossroads
As the 2020s progress, Europe’s nuclear dilemma will only intensify. The continent stands at a crossroads, forced to decide between maintaining its reliance on an increasingly unpredictable United States, or embracing a new, European-driven model of deterrence—one that is politically fraught, diplomatically sensitive, and strategically untested.
Macron has fired the opening salvo in what will likely be a long and contentious debate. Whether his vision gains traction or fades into political rhetoric remains uncertain. What is certain, however, is that Europe can no longer afford to ignore the nuclear question. In an age of great power competition, strategic ambiguity is a luxury Europe may no longer be able to afford.
Europe’s nuclear future is no longer an abstract debate for defense strategists; it is a pressing issue that will shape the continent’s security architecture for decades to come. The question is no longer whether Europe should think about nuclear deterrence but how soon and how decisively it will act before the next crisis forces its hand.
